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West Europe Report

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19 MARCH 1987

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MILITARY, ECONOMIC STRESS INTENSIFIES FOR NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jan 87 p 2

[Commentary by Kari Mottola, a candidate for the degree in political science who is employed as head of the Foreign Policy Institute: "Europe's Neutral Countries Facing New Challenges"]

[Text] The position occupied by Europe's neutral countries has scarcely ever been so noticeably recognized as it is at present. They do not have to defend their decisions. Their neutrality policy is accepted as an important factor in handling the affairs of a part of the world that is divided into two camps.

Prosperity has also considerably increased pressures on the neutral countries to enlarge their political role and increase their military and economic contributions.

From NATO's viewpoint the ratio of conventional weapons between East and West has assumed a more important position than before in Europe. During the next few years [both sides] will begin to reduce the number of their nuclear weapons. The threat of a first strike, on which the West's strategy rests, has in any case become less and less credible.

In this situation the neutral countries' defense capability has gained new importance in the eyes of the West.

The neutral countries are viewed as a relative advantage for NATO since they pursue a policy of armed neutrality and maintain a credible readiness to keep watch over and defend their territories against violations of them. It is the only kind of neutrality that is recognized by the West.

The neutral countries' self-defense is a buffer that gives the West more time to organize its defense, behind Sweden and Finland in Norway, for example.

At best the neutral countries block Warsaw Pact military designs by increasing the risk for an aggressor or stop him from advancing in strategically important spots.

NATO military experts also criticize the neutral countries in an unequivocally energetic manner if they see gaps in their defense systems. Finland recently experienced this on account of the "military vacuum" in Lapland.

Now it is Sweden's turn, Sweden whose naval defense they claim has been weakened, which has attracted Soviet submarines into its territorial waters, and Austria's, which is the only one still without defense missiles.

Superpowers Interested in Neutral Countries' Air Space

Military policy is more complex for the neutral countries. The Soviet Union does not dominate their ways of viewing threats to themselves in the same way as it does in the West. It is just as important to the neutral countries for NATO not to adopt countermeasures against the Soviet Union that involve them.

As the neutral countries see it, a possible war will not break out because of a deliberate attempt to conquer parts of Europe, but rather as the result of a mounting crisis or miscalculations. The West just as well as the East may create an uncontrollable crisis or an unintentional conflict.

In that event the other military alliance may attempt to use neutral territory to preempt military countermeasures. Both sides are interested in the neutral countries' air space.

If, in spite of everything, nuclear weapons were to be used in a European conflict as a warning, for example, the territory of a neutral country might be the target. That would not as readily lead to an extension of the nuclear conflict as a strike on the territory of one of the military alliances would. NATO is bringing its most powerful weapons and new techniques into play in the conventional weapons arms race. The Warsaw Pact must respond to this.

High Tech Is Dividing Europe More Deeply Than Before

It is difficult for the neutral countries to keep up in this race even though their defense strategies do not require systems that are as complicated as those in use in the military alliances. Lagging behind, however, gnaws away at the credibility of their defense capabilities, which are greatly valued by the West.

The neutral countries have run up against the technology embargo imposed on the socialist countries by the United States in adjusting to the rigors of the political environment.

The increasing bisexuality of high tech is widening the new area of conflict: It is being simultaneously applied to civilian and military use. With the increase in military research and development operations, this situation guarantees a continuation of the embargo policy. The neutral countries are tightening their controls over exports and losing orders for goods from Eastern Europe.

The Eureka project, which includes member nations of the European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), bears witness to nations

that are uniting to meet their technological needs. A unified environment favorable to activities is being created for business activities on an international scale.

Dominated by smaller, neutral countries, EFTA must in practice keep up with this harmonization of the NATO countries within the EC.

Eureka also demonstrates how technology is dividing Europe. The socialist countries have been left out of the cooperation program. The leading Western countries do not want their bisexual technology to be leaked to the East via Eureka. The socialist countries would not stand to benefit as partners in cooperation with the United States and Japan either in a race with the EC countries.

The neutral countries have to define the boundaries of their policy of integration with the West. Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria (unlike Ireland) have excluded EC membership from their calculations. This will become all the more evident as the EC's internal and external political integration becomes more deeply rooted during the next few years.

The exclusion of military technology from the neutral countries' economic relations with the West will, however, be a troublesome factor in the future. It is also politically inevitable.

The future of the neutral countries' highly advanced production will depend on the continued importing of technology and even of individual parts from the countries of the West. In crisis situations the economic invulnerability of the neutral countries will depend on how well they preserve these technological ties and, therefore, decisively on the sympathetic understanding of the West.

While the area of conflict between East and West has expanded from political and military issues to include economic and technological issues, a kind of disintegration or decentralization called neutralism is becoming apparent in the structures of the two blocs.

In the Western alliance there are political forces, even governments, that are trying to remove themselves from the enduring conflict between the two systems, the military alliances and the superpowers.

They are looking for alternatives to the perpetual opposition policy and the cold way of thinking in terms of one's own interests alone. These alternatives are the pacifistic tendencies of the peace movement and the disarmament proposals. In its own way this alternatives approach is also an EC-European attempt to achieve independence from the United States and a "European" way of viewing a third power.

While neutralism does not presuppose withdrawal from the military alliance, it has introduced alternatives and a new kind of vagueness into the foreign policies of the West European countries, as Harto Hakovirta (University of Tampere) has demonstrated.

Keeping the distinction between neutrality and neutralism clear has always been a sound practice in the neutral countries' relations with the West.

Neutrality as enclosed within its present bounds is of benefit to NATO. The appealing neutrality policy that encourages neutralism within the alliance may become a problem.

The discussion entered into in the Federal Republic of Germany over an alternative security policy is an example of the blurring of the boundary lines between alliance policy, neutralism and neutrality that serves as a warning to many people.

Neutral Countries' Policy Toward the West Becoming Difficult


In the same way, the model for a nuclear-free policy in Central Europe patterned after Finland or Northern Europe is treading on dangerous, slippery ground.

Speaking at the end of last year, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway declared that she thought it was obvious that the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be ranked equally for the neutral countries: The United States and the neutral countries represent the same set of values in the struggle between the two systems.

We can readily remember that a neutrality policy is not a neutrality policy in terms of values but of one's political role. The neutral countries demonstrate this with their human rights policy and their economic and cultural ties.

Maintaining a neutral role in military and political relations and in the economic relations associated with them will be a demanding task for the neutral countries' policy toward the West in the future. Relations between the neutral countries and the West are becoming problematic and they contain the elements for conflicts.

Neutral Countries Within European Military and Economic Structures



Key:

1. CSCE.
2. Ireland.
3. Finland.
4. Sweden.
5. Switzerland.
6. Austria.
7. CEMA.
8. Warsaw Pact.
9. Yugoslavia.
10. Cyprus.

11,466

CSO: 3617/49

PARTIES' PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES AGREE ON SECURITY ISSUES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Jan 87 p 13

[Article by Jan Linden: "Disguised Foreign Policy Debate"]

[Text] There is never any foreign policy debate in Finland, it has been said. When there is one, it culminates in an exchange of opinions separated by slight differences.

This thesis was reconfirmed yesterday evening when four parliamentary candidates from three parties discussed our security policy and a number of other international issues at the Foreign Policy Institute's meeting.

On all the major issues the participants were surprised to find that they were pretty much in agreement, though with certain slight differences.

The representatives of the Swedish People's Party (SFP), the Finnish Social Democratic Party (Sdp) and the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) agreed completely, among other things, that any strengthening of our armed forces is not necessary for the country's security.

The Foreign Policy Institute had brought together a panel consisting of Ingvar S. Melin (SFP), P.-H. Nyman (SFP), I.-C. Bjorklund (Sdp) and Claes Andersson (SKDL) at the Trade Society for one of the first electoral debates.

Torsten G. Almqvist, the association's president, departed from the usual procedure of having participants read opening statements and instead asked the candidates a number of questions to which they had to provide written replies...

And the replies were perhaps more revealing than usual.

Passive?

Melin was back in his role as a political old fox, Nyman was the candid thinker, Andersson the political novice, and Bjorklund the political philosopher. This is just to give a description of a debate which proceeded in various directions.

The participants agreed entirely that nuclear weapons and today's balance of terror do not provide any security for the future, that Finland should con-

centrate on security and economic cooperation within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process, that the presidential election should nevertheless take place without any outside interference, and that cooperation with neighboring countries should be given high priority.

The first question concerned our neutrality. In his reply Claes Andersson was careful to take a dig at Mauno Koivisto (and the Social Democrats) over the fact that neutrality policy has now become more passive.

"Here as well, we have a low profile," he said. And he added that aid policy, for example, is now based more on business thinking than on humanitarian reasons.

I.-C. Bjorklund replied that the same circles which had called for a more active foreign policy have also called for a more parliamentary policy, which would slow the process up.

"But if Finland is to look after its interests, we must be active," he went on to say. "Isolationism works only when the outside world does not develop."

From the audience, Goran von Bonsdorff answered that activity can nevertheless go too far:

"Koivisto didn't have to say in Stockholm that the submarines aren't Soviet. The Swedes knew beforehand."

P.-H. Nyman said curtly that we can best ensure neutrality by avoiding political gaffes and prejudices.

Into the Council of Europe

Melin spoke in general terms about peace and disarmament but particularly wanted to steer Finland into the Council of Europe.

"Membership in the Council is the condition for our being able to contribute towards a furthering of human rights," he said.

Somewhat surprisingly, Bjorklund agreed that it might be the right time to join the Council of Europe. It is no longer an "Afghan council" and we should now be represented on it, at the parliamentary level as well.

Disarmament--A Utopia

Disarmament and defense were more complicated subjects.

Should all weapons be abolished, read the question.

"Yes!" replied Bjorklund.

"What would be done with the weapons?" Andersson wondered.

"No, peace without weapons only happens in dreams," said Melin.

"A utopia!" wrote Nyman. "There will be still be stocks of weapons."

When the subject of our own armed forces came up, Melin reached the most elevated plane:

"Supplies from the war are now running out. We must now maintain today's level."

"Today the army is only there to maintain order when workers are on strike and to put down domestic unrest," Andersson said.

"Pathetic!" said Nyman. "Once things go bang, it no longer makes any difference what we've got."

"The level of defense has to be adapted to the range of possible threats," Bjorklund pointed out. "What are these?"

The Presidential Election--An Internal Issue

As far as the presidential race is concerned, is there any risk of foreign meddling, was another question.

"No, foreign powers are not interested today," Bjorklund answered.

"History has certain cases," Melin pointed out, showing certain reservations.

"In theory, but such things have to be severely checked!" Nyman said.

"Perhaps there will be indirect actions," Andersson mused.

"Is aid to developing countries to be administered on humanitarian or political grounds?" Almqvist wondered.

"Humanitarian!" Nyman answered.

"It should happen both via the UN and such avenues as give us increased trade," said Melin.

"Via both directions, but aiming at the poorest countries," said Andersson.

"Assistance should be more channeled towards progressive governments," said Bjorklund.

And the exchange of opinions continued in this vein. The differences which exist on foreign policy were well disguised.

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CSO: 3650/63

KRISTIINA HALKOLA, DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE CHIEF, GIVES VIEWS

Helsinki SEURA in Finnish Dec 86 pp 8-9

[Interview with Democratic Alternative chairwoman Kristiina Halkola by Hannu Toivonen: "My 100 Secrets"; date and place not given]

[Text] Stalinist Communist Kristiina Halkola was elected chairwoman of the Democratic Alternative, DEVA, just before Christmas. Nationally renowned as an actress, Halkola has managed to be described not only as Finland's most beautiful chairperson, but also as a tactical solution by means of which DEVA's success at the polls, which does not now beforehand seem very promising, can be increased to acceptable figures. Halkola does not herself take offense at the epithet beautiful; she does, however, deny that her appearance may have influenced the choice of her as chairwoman.

[Question] 1. When and where were you born?

[Answer] In Kuusankoski on 3 June 1945.

[Question] 2. Did you acquire precepts for living in your childhood home which you still observe?

[Answer] I did, but I can't define them.

[Question] 3. What was your life at home as a child like?

[Answer] Happy. A worker's home and Social Democrat parents.

[Question] 4. What sort of upbringing did you have?

[Answer] A good one.

[Question] 5. What did you want to be when you were a child?

[Answer] In those days childhood still went on for such a long time that people had time to change their ideas about what they wanted to be. A bank director, an actress and a pediatric psychiatrist, at least, were on the list.

[Question] 6. How did you start out as an actress?

[Answer] I want to drama school in the fall of 1964.

[Question] 7. Who was or were your favorite actors as a child?

[Answer] Marlon Brando, and he still is.

[Question] 8. When did you fall in love for the first time?

[Answer] As a 5 or 6-year-old. Certainly even before then, if I remember correctly.

[Question] 9. With whom did you fall in love?

[Answer] The neighbor's son, a boy named Heikki, probably.

[Question] 10. What was your first kiss like?

[Answer] I don't remember.

[Question] 11. Do you fall in love easily?

[reply missing]

[Question] 12. What is your idea of a good man?

[Answer] A good human being, consistent in his thinking.

[Question] 13. Are Finnish men good?

[Answer] Sure, I like Finnish men. Furthermore, put down that I have a good one now.

[Question] 14. And what are the best things about Finnish men?

[Answer] That they are Finns.

[Question] 15. And what about Finnish women?

[Answer] The same applies.

[Question] 16. Do we have shortcomings?

[Answer] Probably no more so than others do. I can't really describe them with adjectives. I prefer to use verbs.

[Question] 17. What's your impression of Jorn Donner?

[Answer] Only one verb comes to mind: to disappoint.

[Question] 18. How did you get interested in politics?

[Answer] I've always been interested in things and in the environment in which I live. They affect me and, since I am not passive by nature, I want to influence them.

[Question] 19. When did you adopt a communist world view?

[Answer] I joined the party in 1973, but my view of the world is constantly evolving and becoming more mature.

[Question] 20. What is it that appeals to you in communism?

[Answer] Common responsibility, equality and justice.

[Question] 21. Do you for your part accept the epithets Stalinist or Moscow communist?

[Answer] Not the first. But Moscow, yes, if by that you mean Gorbachev, whose aim is a nuclear-free world by the year 2000.

[Question] 22. Are you a so-called Gorbachevist?

[Answer] Insofar as I understand the term, yes.

[Question] 23. Do you admire the Soviet Union?

[Answer] I have a very favorable opinion of the Soviet Union. I admire the courageous, radical way in which they tackle issues there.

[Question] 24. What, in your opinion, are the worst shortcomings [of the Soviet system]?

[Answer] I'm not a superexpert, but the ponderousness of the administration and the bureaucracy, which they have now begun to eliminate, are problems.

[Question] 25. What is your impression of freedom of speech over there?

[Answer] It's good, better than here in Finland.

[Question] 26. What country would you move to if you had to leave Finland?

[Answer] To an autonomous Soviet Karelia; it's so much like Finland. I am so favorably disposed to Slavism that I wouldn't, for example, choose Sweden.

[Question] 27. What does the fatherland mean to you?

[Answer] Largely the natural environment, that's what I love. The forests, fields, blue waters and the Arctic hills.

[Question] 28. Do we need many parties in Finland?

[Answer] At present, yes.

[Question] 29. Would there be room for the nonsocialist parties in your kind of socialism?

[Answer] Not, for example, for the Conservative Party in its present form, a party that supports the autocracy of the banks.... Of course, the opposition would appear in some form.

[Question] 30. Have you ever doubted your political conviction?

[Answer] I constantly have doubts about everything. I certainly confront myself with counterarguments.

[Question] 31. How does it feel when people call you "Finland's most beautiful party chairperson"?

[Answer] I don't think of myself as a typical party chairman, but the words "most beautiful" are just dandy.

[Question] 32. Did you discuss your chairmanship with your husband?

[Answer] I didn't have time to. I accepted the post on my own decision.

[Question] 33. How did your husband, Eero Melasniemi, feel about it?

[Answer] He was in favor of it afterwards.

[Question] 34. Has it entered your mind that you may have been chosen to save DEVA from defeat in the elections because of your beautiful face or your work as an actress?

[Answer] I'm absolutely convinced that my face has not influenced the matter. My work in politics, and above all my organization work, was influential.

[Question] 35. Has your face been useful to you in your career?

[Answer] Yes and no, in acting roles are assigned according to types.

[Question] 36. You have been proposed as a presidential candidate in your own party. Would you accept [a nomination]?

[Answer] I don't want to discuss that; the matter is not of current relevance.

[Question] 37. What do you think of President Koivisto?

[Answer] He could be more active in foreign policy, especially as concerns the developing countries and most particularly the boycotts of South Africa.

[Question] 38. What does so-called nonsocialist publicity mean to you?

[Answer] It's both good and bad. Personally, I don't need it.

[Question] 39. Does this interview represent so-called nonsocialist publicity?

[Answer] Yes, in its most typical form. The bad one.

[Question] 40. Will you squeeze everything possible out of this publicity?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] 41. How would you summarize your ideas on political leadership?

[Answer] Action by people themselves is what we most need.

[Question] 42. How much Marxist-Leninism have you studied?

[Answer] Not nearly enough. A few basic works in study groups in the 1970's.

[Question] 43. What is additional value? (Editor's note: the difference between the total value created by the worker and the value he is paid for his labor.)

[Answer] It is what the worker brings to the product with his labor. What the proprietor keeps.

[Question] 44. What did Marx mean by dialectics? (Editor's note: a change in ideas, concepts and conditions in which people move toward their antitheses and through them later to unity.)

[Answer] As I understand it, it is achieving a unity of antitheses, a reciprocity of conflicting interests.

[Question] 45. What is the so-called materialistic concept of history? (Editor's note: the conditions, necessities and possibilities for economic activities as a basis for awareness, intellectual forms and culture.)

[Answer] My little brain conceives of the idea as being that we are not pawns of fate, but that everything depends on the circumstances under which we live. Their environment affects humans and humans change when they themselves wreak changes in their environment.

[Question] 46. And what about the theory of ever worsening conditions [illegible passage]? (Editor's note: [a theory dealing] with the destruction of society through the ever worsening crises of the capitalist system.)

[Answer] There are a lot of question marks associated with that one and I'm not sure how much of it I've internalized. It's a question of the destruction of the capitalist system, as the conclusion of which people themselves begin to change the system.... I'm not one to theorize.

[Question] 47. Has the theory just referred to been proven to be true in Finland or elsewhere in the West?

[Answer] The whole theory doesn't interest me.

[Question] 48. What do you think of the fact that some people say that things are going better than ever in Finland?

[Answer] That's true in some respects, over a long period of time. The worker movement's struggle has not been completely wasted. Just think of social security. In comparison with the beginning of the century. On the other hand, the differences between the classes are becoming more and more inordinate; a half a million "official poor" were just discovered in Finland.

[Question] 49. What is the significance of the fact that two-thirds of all Finns may soon be voting for the nonsocialist parties?

[Answer] People's awareness does not necessarily grow and entirely different things have an effect on it.

[Question] 50. What do you think of the so-called yuppies?

[Answer] I don't like the worship of selfishness that is associated with the phenomenon. Yuppism is the selfish worship of pleasure which is marketed with large sums of money.

[Question] 51. How do you feel about the fact that the youth of the socialist countries also seems to be running after Western products?

[Answer] People always want what they don't have. I myself run after Soviet nicknacks and stock up on them.

[Question] 52. Do you know how much they pay for brand-name Western jeans on the black market in Tallinn? (Editor's note: nearly 1,000 markkas.)

[Answer] I don't know, although operators have at times crossed my path too.

[Question] 53. How would you feel if Finland had been made a part of the Soviet Union like Estonia in its time?

[Answer] I don't think about it that way, since it is not a reality. But we would certainly be an autonomous Soviet republic.

[Question] 54. How did you celebrate your election to the chairmanship?

[Answer] By working. With work.

[Question] 55. Are you a great one for celebrating?

[Answer] No.

[Question] 56. Has the so-called Gorbachev alcohol policy affected your drinking habits?

[Answer] Not directly.

[Question] 57. What effect does your chairmanship have on your family life?

[Answer] It demands patience and understanding, which there certainly seems to be enough of.

[Question] 58. Whom does your family include?

[Answer] My husband, 43, Samuel, 18, Verna, 15, Vilma, 13, and Joel, 11.

[Question] 59. What does your big family mean to you?

[Answer] Warmth.

[Question] 60. What are the advantages of a big family in bringing up children?

[Answer] A feeling of togetherness is produced. I myself come from a family of five children.

[Question] 61. Do you spend enough time with your children?

[Answer] I should spend more with them.

[Question] 62. With respect to this, do you readily have a bad conscience?

[Answer] Yes, I do.

[Question] 63. How do you feel about yourself as a mother?

[Answer] Right now, awful.

[Question] 64. And as a wife?

[Answer] Especially good!

[Question] 65. What is a wife's most important duty?

[Answer] To love her husband.

[Question] 66. What does sexuality mean to you?

[Answer] Energy.

[Question] 67. What do you think of the fact that you have been and are regarded as a sex symbol?

[Answer] The whole business is one of the many misconceptions which, as far as I'm concerned, has been foisted on me without my being asked.

[Question] 68. How do you feel when, even later, sexuality has characterized some of your roles on TV entertainment programs?

[Answer] I wouldn't think of it that way.

[Question] 69. How does it feel to be a woman of 40?

[Answer] Very good, I keep moving forward all the time.

[Question] 70. What do you say to people who marvel at the highly vaunted way you look at your age?

[Answer] When you're in a hurry, you don't have time to get old.

[Question] 71. Do you engage in aerobics?

[Answer] No. (smile)

[Question] 72. How do you care for your body?

[Answer] Not at all. I don't have time for that.

[Question] 73. Could you picture yourself in the so-called ladies clubs for mothers of families engaging in fitness programs that are now fashionable?

[Answer] Keeping in shape is in itself a good thing. But I wouldn't have time.

[Question] 74. Have you ever engaged in body building?

[Answer] No. (laugh)

[Question] 75. Do you ever go to a cosmetologist?

[Answer] I've never in my life gone to one. (loud laugh)

[Question] 76. What do you think of the exercise craze?

[Answer] Keeping fit is a good thing, as I said, but the current way of thinking lays emphasis on taking pleasure in oneself, egotism. That I don't approve of.

[Question] 77. Who decides on money matters in your family?

[Answer] We decide together.

[Question] 78. Are you a big spender?

[Answer] I don't have the means.

[Question] 79. What sort of clothes have you bought recently?

[Answer] A winter coat at the ice palace flea market. I paid 150 markkas for it; the fur lining made it more expensive.

[Question] 80. What kind of car do you drive?

[Answer] An old Volga, for years now, my favorite car.

[Question] 81. What would you do if you got 10,000 markkas?

[Answer] I would have my home cleaned for Christmas and would put the rest of the money into the election campaign.

[Question] 82. If you were to win 5 million at lotto, what would you do with it?

[Answer] I would renovate the house I live in.

[Question] 83. How much do you earn a month?

[Answer] It varies since I'm occasionally unemployed; right now [I'm on unemployment compensation]. If I say 6,000 on the average, that's probably not far off the mark.

[Question] 84. How does it feel to be out of work?

[Answer] Depressing.

[Question] 85. Do you as an artist feel at home among workers?

[Answer] Yes, whether I want to or not.

[Question] 86. Do you have friends among your political opponents?

[Answer] I don't know about friends, but there are certainly a lot of pleasant people among them.

[Question] 87. Name three Finnish politicians whom you regard highly.

[Answer] Urho Kekkonen, Hertta Kuusinen and Taisto Sinisalo.

[Question] 88. And three whom you don't regard highly.

[Answer] Risto Ryti, Vaino Tanner and Vihtori Kosola.

[Question] 89. Which nonsocialists do you hold in esteem?

[Answer] I hold people in general in esteem.

[Question] 90. How do reverses affect you in politics?

[Answer] I get mad and [illegible passage] actions.

[Question] 91. What do you get mad at?

[Answer] Injustice and unfairness.

[Question] 92. Do you hold a grudge?

[Answer] No.

[Question] 93. Can you forgive people?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] 94. Do you believe in God?

[Answer] No, it's more important to think about what we humans do to one another.

[Question] 95. What does the church mean to you?

[Answer] It could be separated from the state. It means conservatism and passivism to me.

[Question] 96. Do you ever fear death?

[Answer] No.

[Question] 97. Are you an optimist by nature?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] 98. What's your favorite food?

[Answer] Spaghetti as prepared by my son, very original.

[Question] 99. At which restaurant did you dine most recently?

[Answer] At Shashlik; we women treated.

[Question] 100. How do you celebrate Christmas, a Christian holiday?

[Answer] For me it's not a Christian, but a family holiday. To me it means a time for togetherness.

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CSO: 3617/47

GENERAL STAFF CHIEF REPORTEDLY TO ENTER GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister's Praise

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 30 Jan-5 Feb 87 p 11

[Text] After the praises lavished on the military capabilities of the chief of the National Defense General Staff, Gen N. Kouris, by the prime minister in the Chamber of Deputies, well-informed sources report that his retirement is imminent. The reason for it being that it is reported that the prime minister believes him to be the most appropriate person to conduct the negotiations on the bases from a "zero basis." These negotiations are supposed to start in a few months.

Answering to Mr Mitsotakis in the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Papandreou stated about Gen Kouris: "I must tell you this: I became acquainted with the present chief of the National Defense General Staff when Mr Georgios Rallis was prime minister. Mr Rallis wanted to explain to me--I had the right to know about the Rogers agreement--he wanted to inform me. After attempting to do that for a whole hour, he called in Gen Kouris and said: 'Here is the military man who has full knowledge of the entire affair and who enjoys my full confidence.' This is how I met Gen Kouris. And Mr Rallis was right. He is one of the most up-to-date, most efficient and most responsible leaders the armed forces ever had. I respect Gen Kouris."

Now Gen Kouris is being touted as the deputy minister of foreign affairs coming from non-parliamentary ranks.

Kapsis' Positions

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 30 Jan-5 Feb 87 p 13

[Excerpt] Without any preannouncement or leak to friendly newspapers, Andreas Papandreou opened the way for the replacement of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Kapsis with his appointment as deputy minister of the press as well, a position that had remained vacant since last October, when the government had been reshuffled for the 9th time in 5 years. According to all indications, Mr Kapsis will be replaced at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the present head of the National Defense General Staff Gen Kouris, who will soon be retired and who will become responsible in 1987 for the negotiations regarding the U.S. bases in Greece.

The position of chief of the National Defense General Staff will be taken over by an officer of high rank of the army, who will be promoted from lieutenant general to general in order to replace Ge Nik. Kouris.

BRIEFS

DEPARTURES, VISITS TO CUBA--Our ambassador to Cuba, Elisavet Papazoi, is leaving for that country tomorrow to open our embassy in Havana. She will not have much personnel at this time, only one diplomat and administrative employees, but this is a beginning... And while we are speaking of Cuba, someone else was there recently besides Florakis [head of the KKE]. The prime minister's third son, Andrikos, was recently in Cuba in order to gather material for his dissertation... [Text] [Athens PONDIKI in Greek 3 Feb 87 p 19] /12858

CSO: 3521/82

VATICAN CONCORDAT WITH CHINA UNLIKELY FOR NOW

Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 15 Dec 86 p 4

[Article by Tullio Meli: "Cardinal Casaroli Cools Down the Enthusiasts: 'Vatican-China Concordat? The Time Has Not Yet Come'"]

[Text] Rome—Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, secretary of state of the Pope, has cooled somewhat the enthusiasm produced by a usually well-informed Catholic journal that had implied that the signing of a "concordat" between the Holy See and the PRC was possible within a fairly short period. Casaroli confirmed only that there are contacts between the Church of Rome and the Patriotic Association of Chinese Catholics (tolerated by the government, which imposes on the members a dual oath of obedience to the state and of independence from the Vatican).

To someone who reminded him, in regard to the canonical status of that organization, that in 1981 he had said: "What is illegitimate today can become legitimate tomorrow," the cardinal replied: "I well remember having said that. I made the distinction: when it is a matter of something illegitimate but not invalid, objectively there is the possibility—naturally, the desire is also necessary—of accepting it. However, what is 3 or 4 years to the Chinese?" (A way of saying that not very big steps forward have been taken since then). For that matter, they protested to him, the Church also measures time in centuries. He replied: "But I believe that in this case it is more the Chinese who are moving slowly."

Also in regard to China, the secretary of state said: "In our view, things are simple and complex at the same time. Simple because it is enough that they should accept the community—the hierarchical community, and then that they not ask for many other things." And what about the bishops in marriage covenant? "These are particular problems that arise for situations... It is a problem of community."

Casaroli, who is a clever diplomat, always uses a language rich in nuances; by assuming responsibility for a liberal interpretation, I will thereby clarify for readers that these words do not come very close to the issue. Many of these marriages occurred at the time of the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" and were in practice imposed. These are "particular problems" on which the Church would be inclined to be indulgent. The serious point, on which it cannot negotiate, is the "hierachical community," that is, submission to the Holy

See. It is known that many bishops of the Patriotic Association favor this, but it can only happen with the agreement of the Peking government (and here other, diplomatic problems come into play: withdrawal of recognition of Nationalist China--Taiwan, and official recognition of Communist China).

Casaroli had a cordial exchange of comments with journalists yesterday on occasion of the traditional opening of the new social year of the Rome UCID.

In the conversation with the journalists, he also talked about issues other than China. In regard to the foreign debt of the Third World countries, he said: "The Holy See should strongly emphasize the ethical and humanitarian aspects, but without forgetting that there are technical aspects that cannot be eliminated, because it is not just a matter of settling the debt but of then continuing the economic relationship." The other day, Cardinal Etchegaray had said that issuance of the announced Vatican document was imminent. Will it come out before or after the New Year? "I had thought it would come out before; now I am inclined to think it will come in the new year." And the one on bioethics? Are there difficulties? "Yes, but they are problems of a very technical nature, of translation." Can we say with certainty that this will also go into the new year? "No, I would not say so with certainty."

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CSO: 3528/71

COSSIGA STRESSES 'RESPONSIBILITY' IN NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Jan 87 p 6

[Text] Rome—In an atmosphere that is certainly more relaxed than the one a year ago, free of the ruinous political arguments and the struggles that had marked the final days of 1985, Francesco Cossiga focused his ritual end-of-year speech on a single theme: that of responsibility, linked with the recurring leitmotiv of a steadfast institutional point of reference. Thus, the responsibility of the "governed" in participation and control of the management of "public affairs," and the responsibility of the "governing"; the solidarity of the individual segments of society, "responsible" for the problems and difficulties of others, and the responsibility of the institutions for which there "is a strong need" today as a frame of reference, as a guarantee of liberty and justice for all. Only these, said the president of the Republic, "can overcome the threats of organized crime, and rectify imbalances, tensions, and poverty that are still, unfortunately, widely existing in various areas of the country. Only the institutions can guarantee the security of all, in the orderly communal life of a city as well as in international peace, the supreme benefit that requires unceasing, courageous and farsighted action."

In his television message—which lasted no more than 10 minutes and was marked more by Christian than purely political tones--the head of state avoided returning to what a year ago were called the issues of 1986 (from terrorism to international detente, from combat of inflation to more effective justice) to instead go deeper into the "moral" issue of "responsibility," which took up the major portion of his speech. An insistent call to the duty of "promoting a society that will not be a chain of separate segments. The moral of responsibility risks being fragmented if it lacks the capacity to look beyond our private concern, to look at those who live next to us without economic security or human warmth. We must understand the isolations that surround us: of the old people, of the sick, of those who live on the social margins, and of unemployed youth. Thus, we must cause the solidarity to grow, and decrease the isolation."

It was an appeal that only once assumed a critical tone on the subject of the "serious shortcomings" in numerous services, and the "efficiency of the public structures" that "does not measure up to the vitality of our country," and the president of the Republic used these problems to return to the theme of responsibility, because "in a real democracy all are jointly responsible, the

governing and the governed, because democracy is not only the system of delegates, but also the system of controls and calls to responsibility." He said further in this connection: "There is a growing need for clear and valid rules, for authoritative institutions, solid and modern, if necessary reformed; for rapid, coordinated, efficient, and understandable public actions, which avoid new inequalities, new alienations," in the awareness that only the state and not its absence can guarantee the frame of reference and security in which society and individuals can exercise daily their vitality and responsibility."

Cossiga also briefly touched on the positive aspects of the 1986 balance-sheet. "During the past year we found reasons for confidence. There was a significant recovery of economic life, even if not for all; inflation is close to the European levels; and the companies overall displayed a competitive capability. Certainly, important goals were achieved, even if not to full satisfaction. The benefits of the stability of our institutional system made themselves felt, even though amid conflict and tensions."

And finally, the problems still on the carpet: "Open problems that concern the whole community." Cossiga reminded of preserving the environment and his new planning for "overcoming the false antinomy of environment-development"; cultural and vocational training of the youth, and employment, particularly in the South, "reaffirming the awareness that the destiny of the whole country is linked to the issue of the South"; better meeting of the basic social needs, from health to pensions; the livability of the major urban areas; and the "calm, quiet but firm" care of the "ordered community life and common security against any internal or external threat."

For 1987, Cossiga wished Italy "a year of strengthened courage, intelligent challenge, and renewed responsibility of all for the common good," pointing out that "if we broaden our gaze beyond our borders, among so many tensions, sad conflicts, terrorist threats, and policies, even of major countries, that are uncertain and contradictory, there have appeared recently unexpected bursts of light that suggest an international reality in motion, in evolution toward a more solid peace. And all this fuels our own hope as Italians, our hope as Europeans."

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CSO: 3528/71

BRIEFS

SAN MARINO PSU CONGRESS--San Marino, 15 Dec--The eighth congress of the Unitary Socialist Party (PSU) of the Republic of San Marino concluded with approval of a substantial political document. The PSU boasts eight seats out of 60 in the Titano Council, and has 14 percent of the vote. Together with the San Marino Socialist Party, which has nine seats, and the Social Democratic Party, which has one, it has exactly one-third of the seats and the overall electoral strength in the small republic between Marche and Romagna regions. The document of the PSU congress, in which an official PSI delegation composed of Paolo Babbini, member of the national leadership, and Socialist Deputy Franco Piro participated, contains elements that are valid for describing the characteristics of opposition and government of the Unitarian Socialists of the RSM. In the first place, there is strong criticism of the role played by the PCS as responsible for having overturned the 1983 election result in favor of an agreement with the Titano DC in a kind of hybrid alliance on behalf of the interests. This is a policy that is far from strong among the people and that encounters strong opposition not only in the PSUS, but also by the Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans, who have tested in San Marino what political loyalty means to some, and how audacious can be the initiatives of those who, with divisive intent, describe themselves as outside Europe. [Text] [Rome AVANTI! in Italian 16 Dec 86 p 5] 9920

CSO: 3528/71

KOK ON ROLE AS LEADER OF LABOR PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 2 Jan 87 pp 9-12

[Report on interview with Wim Kok, new leader of the PvdA, and head of its parliamentary group by correspondents Gerard Driehuis and Tom-Jan Meus: "Wim Kok, the politician of the year"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] He is chairman of the PvdA parliamentary group, as if that is a very natural thing. The furniture in his office where Van Dis, a SGP [Political Reformed Party] member, formerly sat is as new as the PvdA leader himself. Everyone is used to it, certainly the group members. They no longer knew any better. Everything changed, only Den Uyl remained all the while. Joop den Uyl is now a regular member of parliament, although he has a somewhat more pleasant office than his average colleague. But as for the rest, there is little more which suggests that Den Uyl was the leader for 2 decades of the mainstream of the Left in the Netherlands. While it lasted a successor had been considered for Den Uyl, so Den Uyl quickly became the successor. It was arranged with some difficulty that Joop keeps a chauffeur and does not have to drive himself.

After all the noise and rumors about who the new leader of the PvdA was to be, he was quickly, quietly succeeded by Wim Kok. In his first appearance in the chamber, in the discussion about the government's statement of policy, he immediately scored high. He perhaps attacked the Minister of Defense Van Eekelen somewhat impetuously, but there was general admiration. Now, a half year later, the parliamentary press thinks that he was the best of all in 1986. The parliamentary press thinks that Kok performs well; the question is how he liked the first half of the year himself.

Wim Kok says: "I just was there, and I had not thought at any time that I would win the prize of the parliamentary press." He thinks it is a bit of nonsense, but he still gets some pleasure out of it. The press apparently thinks his action was a success.

"The beginning was somewhat more difficult than I had thought."

[Question] Your maiden speech was the argument about the government declaration. Then you had to proceed with the contribution of parliamentary group members about whom you had no idea whether they would bring up sensible things.

[Answer] It is not so that I have only obtained a position through the contribution of the parliamentary group members. I also certainly know something myself. I have not walked through the country like a blind man in recent years. But, admittedly I have devoted a great deal of time in recent months to become knowledgeable about affairs, conversations with group members, but especially with coworkers.

[Question] How many members of the parliamentary group did you already know before you came here?

[Answer] I knew a lot of them, but in the case of most of them, I could not explain what they really did here. I could count on the fingers of one hand the group members about whom I knew that well.

Still such a group of 52 people is more orderly than many think. There is a system in it. At first glance, you think that there is no head nor tail to it, but that is anticipating. You do not know the working method, you do not know the procedures. You do not know the power relationships well enough. It involves not only what is said, but also how it is said and what is not said. And who says it and who answers it. You only learn those tricks gradually.

[Question] That will not be otherwise in the FNV Executive Committee?

[Answer] No, but I was a member of it for 16 years and chairman for 12 years. I knew everyone there. They all came to me and that means that you have a good idea of what people want. I can hardly identify anyone here. And therefore I had an extra need of people to help me learn that.

[Question] On whom have you depended a great deal?

[Answer] Wim Meijer, the deputy chairman of the group was very useful. Every new member of the group gets a mentor. I asked if Wim wanted to be that for me. He is very calm, patient and wise. I came at high time into the situation where I became fraction leader and I had a great need of a sounding board and that was Wim.

Adventure

[Question] Were you not afraid that it could go completely wrong? Talents are often burned out when they become fraction leader.

[Answer] I have certainly considered that logically. It was an adventure, but it is working and doing your best. And then you certainly see.

[Question] It was effective at the same time. Your contribution in the discussion about the government declaration scored. Did you also think that?

[Answer] No. I was even properly critical. That is my nature. I am still not exactly a perfectionist, but I have an inclination in that direction. I give more attention to things which I had better do than to matters which are going well. I am not a type who runs around for days with a song in his heart because I have done well.

[Question] When you made yourself available for the chamber, it was still not obvious that you would become both fraction and party leader. It appeared then that the PvdA would continue to govern.

[Answer] Alas! I had not calculated so much on that. I expected to operate as usual for a time in the fraction. But it all went somewhat faster. Moreover, I did not assume at all that the PvdA would continue to govern anyway and also that it was clear then that I would be minister. I had thought I would be able to operate for a time in the chamber, but things went faster.

In the winter months before the elections, the somewhat unreal situation developed for me that the opinion polls indicated that I must be a leading candidate. There was a sort of movement, outside all the organized party cadres, that I certainly must be. That was very unreal.

[Question] That was not so dreadfully unorganized. There was de Vara, there was Jan Nagel with his supporters.

[Answer] Alas! the red family is so large. In every case, I had a strong impression that things happened to me where I did not know where I stood, while I myself certainly was the main issue: The whole business is now precisely a year ago. I wound up in a whirlpool. Everybody said that I must be a leading candidate, while nobody had asked what my opinion about that was. I afterwards gave it quickly. Namely that it was too early; that one could not ask that of me.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] To begin with, because I thought that you do not operate with Den Uyl that way. But certainly also that you must not ask me to fill that role so quickly. At that time, it exceeded the potentialities, which I think I have. You yourself feel that is best.

[Question] But after the elections that could be obvious.

[Answer] Then there was really no more choice. It was putting up with a lot for a long time. But after the elections there was only one way and that was forward.

Strange Existence

[Question] The selection as politician of the year is naturally somewhat relative, but the parliamentary press can certainly make or break politicians.

[Answer] I tend to consider that very relatively. Kees Van Dijk was the winner 2 years ago and now is third on the list of the failures of the year... But it is undoubtedly an exception. It is very nice that the way you operate makes a good impression. You naturally like to hear nice things about yourself, but that also indicates that things are going well.

This is a strange existence. You work with a lot of people, but it is still with a certain restriction. The contact continues, if you do not watch out, no further than with the journalist and the fraction member, or the camera, where yes or no, a cameraman stands behind it. In the 6:30 news even that is not the case. You sit there talking before a camera which is completely automatic, but there are then several million people who decide on the basis of what you say whether you are doing well or not. It is naturally nice to see that people think you are doing well. Anyway I need that. After 21 May, we had agreed that we would never look at opinion polls anymore, but if they appear it is still nice if it seems that we stand a good chance. In that sense it is nice to see that the press thinks I am doing well.

[Question] In view of that fact, was it perhaps not worse to continue to occupy your present position before 21 May?

[Answer] Consequently I am not made up that way. I must be behind myself, have the conviction I can do it. And last winter, I had the conviction that I was not ready to be the leading candidate.

The Little World

[Question] You said precisely that the danger of the Inner Court is that it has a restrictive effect. Is that different than with the FNV?

[Answer] It is not really entirely different, it is difficult to make the distinction. But it is naturally true that here, as that is so in the FNV, the VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises] or the top of a profession, you as chamber members together are going to often consider something more important than it is. That has nothing to do with your opinions, but with the little world here.

[Question] Take what happened recently: There were 200 votes, you have joined in the voting we assume..

[Answer] Occasionally: ...yes, sometimes for, sometimes against...

[Question]...But of that there are 180 which are concerned about details, about which no one will ask any further. Then many people are busy with that for hours. Can you still not address that?

[Answer] But aside from that: that cannot be otherwise. You are busy with legislation, which leads to motions and amendments, and then you must vote about that--it cannot be otherwise. I willingly agree that you sometimes can question whether it was important to propose motion 36 or amendment 646 is now really so significant, but I think that you cannot do much about that. Even if they would not be proposed, you still have a vast majority left.

[Question] But what you still see is that people who walk around here for a long time are going to find the average. Things are said here because they must be said, while everyone knows that proceeding any further serves no purpose.

[Answer] Yes, you see that sometimes. And I also have had to get used to it, although you have heard that through quickly. You must also get through the procedures, the chamber's mechanics.

The Second Chamber's meeting bell strikes: once short and once long. This, for example, what does this now mean? If at such a time, someone does not take me by the hand and say what is going to happen, I am lost. The lighter gets up: I just look. She comes back 5 minutes later: No, it is nothing.

He continues: I mean consequently that people in a definite organization--even the Second Chamber--create a reality of their own. Then it sometimes involves formal things which have nothing to do with the content. About who may do what, who is the real speaker--those things. But it is naturally not true that politicians are busy with this for days.

Joop Himself

[Question] It appears almost a bit painful for Den Uyl; he appears very quickly dispensable, while everyone precisely thought that he was indispensable.

[Answer] I have discussed it several times with Joop himself in recent months. And he says--he also means that, I am convinced--that he sees it as a confirmation of his opinions about his departure. He is pleased that it is going well.

[Question] Does he really mean that?

[Answer] Yes, a man who is so indivisibly bound up with the PvdA, I believe he had leadership positions in the party since 1948, he naturally does not have immediately after his departure the attitude of: the weal and woe of the PvdA does not concern me anymore.

[Question] Is it not embarrassing that he still is a member of the group?

[Answer] I do not think so.

[Question] Is it convenient?

[Answer] Now, in every case it is very pleasant that you can always step in on Joop den Uyl and say: just talk with me, tell me more about that matter. That did not happen so often recently, he spent some time in America, consequently it was not possible then. But now I speak with him more frequently, although it is not like: now I must go ask the approval of the old boss. But you meet each other, in the fraction, outside it, and then you naturally speak with each other.

[Question] You do it differently than he, I say?

[Answer] I do not know. For when he was there I was still not a member.

[Question] But the parliamentary journalists ascertain it almost on a mass basis. And you still knew Den Uyl.

[Answer] I have no objections. For once again, I was not in the fraction when Joop was leader.

[Question] During the Den Uyl government fraction members were quite satisfied if they found a line of the contribution they submitted to him in his speech. You literally absorb entire parts. They are small things, but not unimportant for many a fraction member.

[Answer] Playfully. Perhaps that is only a temporary luxury.

[Question] There is no policy behind that? Den Uyl was the fraction all by himself?

[Answer] You are naturally very dependent on your environment in the first months. I would not have exhibited any indiscretion if I had to do it all, but in spite of all your preliminary work, your conversations, your files, your quality depends on what you are delivered. But you must still finally do it yourself. For you can complete a fantastic first term and subsequently be nowhere anymore, but that does not help you. Consequently it involves in the long run your getting to the bottom of those things yourself better.

Van Eekelen

[Question] That satire aimed at Van Eekelen, on second thought perhaps somewhat tearful, was an example of a distorted evaluation?

[Answer] No, not of distorted evaluation. You can often dispute about the words you use. I saw, for that matter, that I have helped Van Eekelen at one point on your hit list because he could have parried my attack so skillfully.

[Question] While he did nothing else but simply remain seated.

[Answer] The intention from the beginning to the end was to precisely address Lubbers about this. I admit directly that it did not succeed well. But Lubbers had taken responsibility for a team on which Van Eekelen is a member. He should not have had to take that risk.

[Question] But when you make such a fierce attack, you might expect that there is a strategy behind it. That after this attack something else will come. But nothing more came.

[Answer] No, that was also discussed in the fraction. And I then said myself that I did not think it desirable to propose a motion of no confidence. Then the newspaper headlines would have again said that we played up to the man. And, moreover I continued to say: it involved Lubbers, who had included Van Eekelen in his cabinet. That was a mistaken evaluation. And afterwards we had expected the defense.

[Question] But if that was so, you obviously had thought that Lubbers would have said after your words: yes, now you have said it Mr Kok, Van Eekelen must indeed go. Was that not simply a blunder?

[Answer] No blunder, but the way in which further publicity developed made it clear to me that some reflection is necessary about it here at the center.

[Question] Yes, for Harry van den Bergh has once again said this summer in ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE that even a parliamentary investigation must again take place to expose Van Eekelen's responsibility. Afterwards came your attack and then nothing. Has something else perhaps happened meanwhile?

[Answer] No, there is no deeper strategy behind it. I am also not acquainted with that interview, I agree what you say makes sense, but the strategy has not changed.

[Question] You naturally have difficulty in keeping up with all the interviews which Harry van den Bergh gives.

[Answer] Then I must establish here a separate box with 51 files, a separate box for the file of member Van den Bergh.

The parliamentary press: It is improving the PvdA's image; now its chilly eastern European appearance besides. Socialism is warmth from inside out, Wim! The politician of the year: Wim Kok.

An explanation. The members of the parliamentary press get a ballot every year on which they can indicate who in their eyes was the best politician. A first place yielded two points, a second, one point.

Besides the professional Inner Court watchers were allowed for the first time this year to also indicate whom they regarded as the worst. It was an exciting contest. Bert de Vries was in the race for a long time, "dull, formalistic, the nonsense of the horse show." But Rudolf de Korte won with a good lead. A few reasons: "I have never met an emptier vessel. If Lubbers swings, then I swing with him. Much ado about nothing. This is not a politician but a hot air balloon."

The politician of the year and the failure of the year: Wim Kok and Rudolf de Korte.

POLITICAL SITUATION, LEADERSHIP ENVISIONED FOR 1987

Agenda Topics Noted

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 3 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpts] The forecasts for 1987, the year that has just arrived, have been made. And they are generally in agreement: elections, elections, elections. We prefer to follow a different path and emphasize other great topics that will be on the agenda in this time of transition. These topics, though dissimilar in absolute importance, are all of consequence in their political impact:

--Demonstration of the fact that relative economic prosperity alone does not guarantee the solution to the political system's mortal sins so much as, up to a certain point, it precipitates it;

--Dr Cavaco Silva's challenge, to confirm (or not) the unique hypotheses that he has at his disposal to uncontestably lead the right in the short term and be their potentially unbeatable candidate in the 1996 presidential elections;

--The PS's test, regarding its ability to exploit right away the PRD's collapse, and, in the middle term, the PCP's leadership crisis after the inevitable natural succession of Dr Alvaro Cunhal.

We purposely did not mention the possible (or even probable) parliamentary elections of October 1987. In the first place, for many people, they are not problematical questions; everything points toward their being almost a fait accompli. In the second place, they are not worth anything by themselves; they can be an instrument at the service of deeper and more demanding designs, just as they can leave everything more or less the way it was in 1986. In the third place, even if there were to be no elections in 1987, the questions enumerated above would be and always will be fundamental. On them depends the most likely political scenario for the first time that we have left until the end of the 20th century.

Economy and Political System

The year 1987 is going to confirm the assertion that relative economic prosperity (which is the result of objective conditions, but also of unquestionably good government management) is not enough to solve the mortal sins of our political system.

Governmental instability, the difficulty in forming coherent and stable parliamentary majorities, the institutional conflicts emerging from that difficulty between the government and the Assembly of the Republic, the destruction on the left without clear party leadership which may prefigure a credible alternation in the exercise of political power, a growing separation between voters and elected officials--all of this, which has become a part of our day-to-day reality and weakens the practice of our political system, cannot be repaired or ignored through the panacea of mere economic management.

On the contrary, these last 12 years have shown that, whenever a government delivers a good economic performance or is near doing so, a political crisis appears--either because the opposition parties fear the political exploitation of that success, or because the holders of power themselves are divided, corrupted, or fragmented on account of the easy climate which favors ambitions and stimulates appetites, or even because the government intends to take advantage of the favorable tide to reinforce the parliamentary weight of the party or parties that uphold it.

The drama is that, in 1987, as in 1977, 1979, and 1985, the real and grave problems of the political system may come out in the open, in spite of a more than favorable context from the economic point of view.

Cavaco and Leadership of the Right

Furthermore, 1987 will be the year during which Dr Anibal Cavaco Silva will be able to reaffirm and consolidate his leadership of the right and the government, and create conditions for a possible promising presidential candidacy in 1996. It is sufficient for him to know how to use the political initiative that being the government, albeit a weak one, always provides. He will reap benefits from the era of prosperity and from a popular image that he has known how to create and maintain almost undamaged.

One year ago, for many people (including us), Dr Cavaco Silva deserved to be prime minister in order to be able to show the correctness of the strategy that he had outlined. One year later, it seems clear to us that his strategy was not correct, either in the timing of elections, or in refusing pre-election alliances for Parliament, or in underestimating adverse political factors, or in the failure to foresee the need to provide a remedy in case the publicly proclaimed policy went sour, as it did.

Nevertheless, this past year has served to show that Dr Cavaco Silva is a competent economic manager and a charismatic leader who is spectacularly

popular. More than that, he is by far the best politician on the right to lead his party and govern the country. Since we do not live in an ideal world, but rather caught up in Portuguese reality, he has been, for more than a year, the best that we have, far ahead of all the rest.

Political lucidity is not compatible with personal whims, pouting, grudges, or the naivete of confusing our partisans or allies with those who attach themselves to us, as they already attached themselves to Dr Freitas do Amaral's candidacy when their true sympathies lay elsewhere.

At the moment of truth, no matter how much his self-importance, cultural short-comings, technocratic tendencies, and demagogical excesses may cost us, when what is at stake is the struggle for a parliamentary majority and a man who, in relative terms, is by far the right's best bet--one must not hesitate. It is important that he win.

The PS and a Golden Opportunity

Finally, 1987 will be the golden opportunity for the PS to collect the coveted dividends from the destruction of the PRD and prepare itself for the crisis of succession that, sooner or later, will naturally arrive in the only party that has not yet come to the end of the era of its founders--the PCP.

In other words, in 1987, the PS and Dr Vitor Constancio will be able to take giant steps toward a clear hegemony on the Portuguese left. And the country really needs a strong democratic left that can be an alternative to the government, so that the autocratic left that the PCP has foreshadowed will be brought back to its real dimensions and forced to become reconverted, at least strategically; so that the left without any programmatic content, which is the PRD, will be reduced to its most insignificant expression; so that the right itself, namely the most socially and economically advanced, as is the PSD, will receive the challenge of worrying less about the constituent domination of power; so that alternation will effectively exist and ideological and political quagmires can be avoided.

It is only to be hoped and desired that the socialists will win this battle of theirs and give new strength to the democratic left in Portugal.

Since it is not possible that 1987 will be a year of reconsideration and correction of certain mortal sins of our political system, let it at least be a year in which the governing class in general will wake up to debate ideas, that allocation of zones of influence in radio and television will not spoil free alternation of power in the future, that Dr Cavaco Silva will strengthen his leadership on the right and the PS will affirm its hegemony on the left.

That is not too much to hope for. Or is it, looking at the political bottom line for 1986?

Cavaco Silva, Freitas do Amaral

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 3 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] The return of Freitas do Amaral to the political scene with the beginning of work on the 21st Century Foundation has once again revived the struggle for leadership of the right. It is a secret to no one that, in time, the law professor aspires to that leadership. Moreover, in the presidential elections, he clearly seemed to be the foremost figure of the Portuguese right, while Cavaco Silva emerged simply as party chief. Freitas looked down on Cavaco from above.

But that is not the main question. The problem is that Freitas do Amaral will find that Cavaco Silva is a circumstantial phenomenon, destined to pass quickly. Deep down, he will see him as a technocrat--a mere manager--, while seeing himself as a man who unites politics and culture.

It certainly was not by chance that Freitas started the work of his foundation as a figure, not just of the French intelligentsia, but of the "new French intelligentsia." The ex-leader of the CDS is thus trying to present himself to the country as the future of the right, leaving to the president of the PSD the lesser role of administrator of the present. Of course, a certain class feeling is probably not foreign to this vision of things. Freitas do Amaral comes from a distinguished family from the north; Cavaco, from a well-to-do family from the south. Freitas do Amaral went from the seventh year of secondary school into the university; Cavaco had to opt for a technical course and attended the Commercial Institute before going into Economics [School]. Freitas do Amaral finished the university with the natural attitude of one who just followed a family tradition; Cavaco, with the marks of one who fought every step of the way up. For all these reasons, it is understandable that Diogo Freitas do Amaral does not see Cavaco Silva as his "equal," and that he considers that it is to him and not to the leader of the PSD that the right (and the duty) to lead the Portuguese right belong.

Only the future will tell if Freitas is a permanent constellation and Cavaco a shooting star; whether the former will remain, in spite of February's defeat, and whether the latter will fade, in spite of the success that he has had so far as the head of his party and the government. It is probably not out of line to recall, meanwhile, that history is full of cases in which the aristocracy of society and thought had to let itself be led by men who came from the lower classes. And it is obvious why: while some only had to fulfill a destiny, others had to bend it--and that developed ambition, resistance and the fighting spirit in them.

The case of Salazar, although the best known, is not unique. At the beginning of his government, he was looked on with haughtiness and some disdain by the upper classes. By a curious coincidence, the country has been governed in this century for a much longer time by men of modest backgrounds than by politicians from good families from the north or the south.

PSD: PROFILES OF RISING OFFICIALS GIVEN

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 3 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] The year 1986 was Cavaco Silva's year of affirmation. As a ruler, he created, in accelerated fashion, his political "tradition." But 1986 was, likewise, PSD's year of affirmation. Alone in the government, it showed its qualities and its defects. The polls are unanimous: the PSD has become the major Portuguese party and its hegemony seems to be here to stay.

Some people speculate that Cavaco Silva probably has no plans for the future. But those who know him best claim that he has a plan in which the whole PSD has a place: leftist sectors, namely the liberal left, and people connected with the 21st Century Foundation. They claim that it is a medium and long-term plan aimed at creating a great bloc to modernize Portuguese society, which the PSD and Cavaco Silva would lead.

At the outset of 1987, the year of the great trial by fire of the Social Democratic leader and the year which will mark Portugal's political future for some time, it is fitting to ask who are the men on Cavaco's team, the men who may be in the Portuguese political limelight for many years to come. We have selected just 10 from among those who are a part of his government (there are others: regional leaders, party men, personnel in technical offices, figures removed from active political life, etc.) and for each one of them, the same reference: how old will they be 10 years from now, in 1996, a presidential election year in which Cavaco Silva, even if he does not admit it or is not contemplating it, will be a natural candidate, able to give up the leadership of PSD?

Leonor Beleza

She will be 47 years old in 1996. A spectacular launch into big-time politics as minister of health. Intelligent and hard-working, courageous and a fighter, the qualities that made her an unquestionable case of controversy and... popularity. She has been performing competently and it is not out of place to recall that Margaret Thatcher began her ascending career with a brilliant performance in Social Affairs.

Fernando Nogueira

He will be 46 in 1996. He proved himself to be a good minister of parliamentary affairs, having delegated his powers in the information sector to the young Marques Mendes. Good knowledge of PSD's districts. Being an excellent tactician, he was forced to alter strategy, and he did so by bending in time and correctly. A type of personality that perhaps does not embody the "heroic myth" of the Social Democratic militants, but who could come to have power as a less exposed but influential piece in Cavaco Silva's political chess game.

Pedro Santana Lopes

He will be 40 in 1996. He plays a key governmental role as secretary of state of the presidency of the council of ministers. He has constant contact with the prime minister. He, along with Eurico de Melo and Fernando Nogueira, is a part of the exclusive group of advisers of Cavaco Silva already known as the "politburo." His main qualities are courage, combativeness and political instinct. Add to that a lasting knowledge of the party's bases and a great flexibility for electoral campaigns. He has filled his position with discretion and competence.

Jose Manuel Durao Barroso

He is the same age of Santana Lopes, and the two are great friends. He was an academic leader, heading the MRPP in the turbulent years of the revolution. He maintains the same fighting spirit, but his most important qualities are intelligence and education, the base of his prestige in academic circles and among many leftist intellectuals. His success heading the POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW is important. He still has a great capacity for work and a considerable militant dedication. He has fulfilled his role in the government with discretion and efficiency, whether in internal administration or in the sensitive information sector.

Carlos Pimenta

A notable case of admiration of the left and of "good press." He performs his duties with a great capacity for work and ambition. An intelligent and well-prepared young man, he has filled his position with courage and adroitness, giving rise to praise from the most diverse sectors. More closely linked to Pinto Balsemao, he was a staff member called by Cavaco Silva when the latter formed his government. He will be 41 years old in 1996.

Luis Valente de Oliveira

Ten years from now, he will be 59. He has the full support of the prime minister and his position in the government remained intact even after the internal and parliamentary failure of his "great options." Intelligent, reflective, and creative, he has performed his job in a discreet fashion, concerned with careful consideration of the great questions of our development. A long-distance runner.

Jose Silva Peneda

A reasonably obscure talent, a tireless worker, and an intelligent and well-prepared mind. He coordinates important funds of the EEC, from which he draws great power in relation to the regional institutions. In spite of the "invisibility" of what he does, he is a politician with influence and is on the rise. In 1996, he will be 46 years old.

Rui Carp

Basic qualities: calmness and prudence. Because of this, he may be able to achieve that double personal and political victory of managing to have an excellent relationship with Minister Cadilhe and his difficult disposition, and, especially, not being contested by any political sector, an unheard-of fact in a budget official. Long experience in that area and a great capacity for work. He will be 46 in 1996.

Manuel Correia de Jesus

He will be 55 in 1996. With long parliamentary experience and a deeply give-and-take disposition, he has performed very well in his difficult position in the turbulence of Parliament. A veteran of the fights in the Assembly, he has had the role of calming things down. He is still an important bridge between the continent and the regions, especially with Alberto Joao Jardim, his fellow countryman.

Jose Silveira Godinho

An economist of unquestionable competence, he will be 53 in 1996. Hard-working and meticulous, he puts great energy into all his actions. An example of honesty as well as of prudence and sensibleness. A valuable man. He has played a moralizing role in national defense, reinforcing his good image within his party.

9895/9738

CSO: 3542/41

BRIEFS

LIBYAN OFFICIAL DENIED VISA--Former Libyan Prime Minister Abdel-Ati Elobeidi unsuccessfully waited in Paris for the granting of a visa by Portuguese authorities in order to participate in the annual meeting of the presidency bureau of the World Peace Council, which took place in Lisbon from 23 to 26 January. Abdel-Ati Elobeidi, who is also a former secretary general of the People's Congress and president of the Peace and Solidarity Council, was on an official mission to a number of European countries. He was waiting in Paris for the granting of the visa, which was finally not awarded until the first day of the meeting in Lisbon, at which time he returned to Libya. According to information our newspaper received, an individual accompanying the Afghan representative, Anaita Retedzad, who asked for an entry visa for Portugal at the last minute, spent one night at the Portela Airport awaiting this visa, which was finally granted. [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 30 Jan-5 Feb 87 p 5] /12858

CSO: 3542/57

FORMER MINISTER CRITICIZES OZAL, SABANCI TALKS WITH CARTER

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 4 Nov 86 p 8

[Text] Ankara—Hasan Esat Isik, a former minister of defense and foreign affairs, criticized Prime Minister Turgut Ozal for meeting with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during his official visit to Bangladesh.

In a statement on this issue, Isik said:

"I do not think that the participation of unofficial foreigners in gatherings related to official visits conforms with diplomatic customs. Indeed, when Prime Minister Ozal invited the U.S. ambassador to Turkey to a dinner he gave to honor Carter in Istanbul, the ambassador turned down the invitation saying that 'Carter has no official capacity.'

"Moreover, it is still not clear what Carter discussed with the Prime Minister. TRT [Turkish Radio and TV Administration] reports did not indicate that the Cyprus issue was discussed. The Prime Minister disclosed this when queried by reporters. The Prime Minister also said that Carter made reference to Sabanci and that he told him that he would support the university Sabanci wants to establish. Our papers have reported that during Sabanci's visit to the United States Carter arranged for him to meet Greek Cypriots. The importance Carter attaches to this issue is well known. In addition, Carter visited and met with the [Greek Orthodox] patriarch at Fener during his visit to Istanbul. Is it possible that Carter wants to support Sabanci in his initiatives on this issue? The Turkish public must be clearly informed about these issues."

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CSO: 3554/132

OPPRESSION OF TURKS IN IRAQ CLAIMED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 13

[Text] Ankara—Officials of the Iraqi Turks' Solidarity Association visited the Motherland Party [MP] headquarters and asked for assistance from Osman Dogan, the chairman of the Interior Affairs Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TGNA].

Mahir Nakip, secretary general of the Association of Iraqi Turks met with Sanliurfa deputy Osman Dogan—who is also the MP's deputy chief of Public and Press Relations—in the MP's general headquarters and reported that Turks in Iraq are being oppressed. Stating that Iraqi Turks are fleeing from Iraq through Iran, Nakip said that 200 such families are waiting in Iran to enter Turkey and asked that they be given passports.

Turks Exiled From Iraq

Nakip insisted that in 1982 Iraq enacted a deportation law envisaging the "dispatch" of Iraqi Turks to the country's south and that it could not implement the law because of the war with Iran. He said: "This law will be enforced as soon as the war is over. Iraq formulated this plan to break the Turks' ties with Anatolia and to isolate them geographically." Stating that the Iraqi government has subjected the Turks of Kirkuk to political oppression and that it has not allowed students wishing to study in Turkey to travel to this country, Nakip said:

Kirkuk Should Be Invaded If Necessary

"The goal of our association is to ensure that the Iraqi Turks can live on their own land. The only country that can help us attain this goal is Turkey. We hope that Turkey can resolve these problems peacefully and without breaching its foreign policy principles."

Nakip asked Osman Dogan to consider the Kirkuk issue as a national issue. Nakip was asked: "By saying 'national issue' do you mean that Turkey should invade Kirkuk?" He replied: "If that is what is required for the prosperity of Turks in Iraq and if it will bring peace then we want that. However, we do not want something like that if it will exacerbate the problem."

Osman Dogan said that he will "convey the problems reported by the officials of the association to the government and the pertinent authorities in the strongest terms" and that he will "pursue the association's problems."

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CSO: 3554/126

ACTIVITIES OF TURKISH LEFTISTS ABROAD REPORTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Nov 86 p 9

[Text] Ankara—The split of Turkey's social democrats into the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] and the Democratic Left Party [DLP] is also echoed among social democratic Turks in Europe. The Democratic Leftists have split from the pro-SDPP Populist Revolutionary Federation [PRF] and have begun work to form a new organization.

After the 8th congress of the PRF, which is headquartered in Duisburg, FRG, in April 1985, a group of DLP sympathizers split from the PRF. PRF leaders accused the breakaway group of "dividing the social democrats."

Remzi Uysal, a former Lubeck delegate to the PRF and the head of the Turkish Democratic Left Working Group in Lubeck, is one of those who broke with the PRF. Uysal stated that SDPP's Istanbul Provincial Leader Hasan Fehmi Gunes has described his organization as "divisive" and said: "I cannot remain silent in the face of charges of divisiveness because of my faith in myself and similar-minded colleagues who believe in the principles of the DLP."

Stating that the PRF has rejected the "spirit of the National Independence Army," Uysal said that social democratic movements in Western Europe are built on various social and cultural foundations and that the social democratic movement of the Turkish Democratic Left must be based on the "spirit of the National Independence Army." He continued:

"The SDPP, a friend of TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association], has assumed the function of protecting and harboring movements in Turkey which have not yet organized themselves along their own ideologies. With its new program, the PRF leadership—which has been marching in the footsteps of the SDPP—has turned the PRF into a sanctuary for outside leftist movements and ideologies which have not seen the need to form their own organizations."

Unification Under DLP

The leader of the Turkish Democratic Left Working Group insisted that the pro-SDPP PRF cannot solve the problems of Turks in Europe and said:

"Trying to appear strong by joining hands with the strong is nothing but self-deception. The DLP has defended Ataturk's reforms and principles without compromise, has fought to implement them fully in Turkey and has made itself accepted by overcoming all obstacles before it with the strength it has received from the people. We believe that our endorsement of the DLP and its principles and our readiness to defend them and to make all sacrifices for them under today conditions, must seem alarming to those who want to appear strong. Those who are accusing us of being divisive must know that the only unification we can accept is one on the DLP platform and under DLP's roof. This has already begun. What is evident requires no guidance."

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LIFTING OF PARLIAMENTARIANS' IMMUNITY CALLED POLITICAL ACT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 15 Nov 86 pp 1,13

["Observation" column by Ugur Mumcu: "Immunity"]

[Text] Immunity is a privilege designed to assure parliamentarians that they can perform their duties freely. This assurance is now being abolished by the parliamentary majority of the government party. The Assembly's Joint Commission on Constitution and Justice is lifting the immunity of Adana deputies Cuneyt Canver and Ali Ihsan Elgin who have opposed torture and corruption.

The issue will most probably be debated on the floor of the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly] next week. Canver's proposal for an investigation of Tahsin Sahinkaya, a member of the Presidency Council, will most probably be on the agenda of the TGNA during the same week.

The TGNA will discuss charges that Sahinkaya procured unfair gains during his tenure as Commander of the Air Force by virtue of Canver's proposal. This discussion will be followed by the examination of the issue of Maritime Bank loans given to the son of Nejat Tumer, former Commander of Naval Forces and member of the Presidency Council.

The prospect of lifting Canver's immunity just at this time is highly disconcerting.

With its votes, the MP [Motherland Party] assembly group will ensure the rejection of the proposal on Sahinkaya and will lift the immunity of Canver who submitted this proposal.

All this will happen in the same week or at most in the same month.

Nation Party leader Osman Bolukbasi's immunity was lifted in the same manner in 1957. That move was not a source of pride for the Democratic Party majority in the TGNA. The Democratic Party government fell on its face in the environment created by this and other similar decisions.

Those who did not listen to their conscience when voting for lifting Bolukbasi's immunity in June 1957 listened through earphones to the remarks of the Chairman of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice at Yassiada in June 1961.

It is interesting that the single-party phase of our political history has been more liberal on the issue of political immunity than our multiparty period.

Would you like to hear an example?

In December 1948, a parliamentary deputy named Kemal Ozcoban called the government a "thief." His punishment for doing that was disbarment from three sessions of the assembly. That was all. Ahmet Tahtakilic, who at 70 can fight for freedom more vigorously than young men today, was punished by being barred from attending three sessions of the assembly for insulting the TGNA in December 1948.

During the one-party period, deputies were given "disciplinary punishment" for their conversations in parliament anterooms and corridors. In contrast, during the multiparty period their parliamentary immunity is lifted for the same offense.

[Former Prime Minister] Menderes lifted Bolukbasi's immunity. In 1967, today's "champion of liberty," Demirel, lifted Celik Altan's immunity. Now it is our liberal prime minister's turn. He, too, is going to show the gates of prison to Canver, who has placed corruption on the TGNA's agenda. That way, the other deputies will have been intimidated.

Bolukbasi, Cetin Altan and now Canver and Elgin. Have no doubt that there will be others.

The TGNA repealed Turkish Labor Party deputy Cetin Altan's immunity on a midnight in June 1967. Republican People's Party [RPP] leader [Ismet] Inonu sagaciously cautioned Demirel:

"I would advise sincerely that the government maintain its common sense and that it avoid creating the precedent of 'lifting a deputy's immunity and prosecuting him' by being carried away with prejudicial and unfair provocations."

Nihat Erim said: "You made the decision and you are going to eat it." RPP deputy Ferda Guley defended Cetin Altan in a language that could cause envy among lawyers.

Responding to remarks by Republican Reliance Party deputies Coskun Kirca and Emin Paksut, Cetin Altan said:

"Today, I may join a liberal party and if that party does not work and collapses I can go and become a member of an etatist party; if that does not work for me or if new developments occur I can go and form a new liberal party. I would be guilty not for doing this but for not doing it. I have openly declared myself as a socialist. I am candid. Perhaps I will not be able to speak here again, perhaps then it will be possible to muffle my voice physically. However, your children will hear my voice. They will hear my voice from this podium."

At that time anyone who could write and who could understand law defended Cetin Altan. Meanwhile, I wrote an article in the magazine KIM examining the issue of immunity. Everyone defended Cetin Altan.

Now, these memories appear as if they are a thousand years old. Those well-known faces appear to have been shrouded in fog and those friendly voices appear to be coming from old records. Cetin Altan has long renounced his socialism and has become a "liberal." In those days he would say: "My offense was not being a liberal." Since then he exonerated himself of that offense by making a "dialectic leap" and attained "liberalism." Now he defends this arabesque, Turkish-style liberalism every day with his eloquent and agile pen.

At that time he said: "Your children will hear my voice." Indeed, the children did hear Cetin Altan's voice. Cuneyt Canver was one of the children then. At that time, it was Cetin Altan who was used for target practice; today it is Canver.

Those familiar faces shrouded in fog, those friendly voices coming from old records...

The MP deputies voted to remove the immunity of one of their minister colleagues who had abandoned them. The minister's offense was accepting a bribe from a businessman. The MP deputies will now cast their votes to remove the immunity of opposition deputies who have forced the discussion of corruption and torture in the TGNA.

The deputies who will cast votes on the issue of immunity must learn lessons from the past and must weigh these cases in their consciences.

This is a matter of immunity. One never knows. Perhaps one day they, too, will need the "armor of immunity."

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CSO: 3554/132

ELECTORAL SYSTEM DEBATE BEGINS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 3

["Showcase" column by Yavuz Donat: "Mufti or Zuhtu?"]

[Text] Yesterday we had a phone conversation with Halil Sivgin of the Motherland Party [MP] who is currently in Europe.

He told us that he has "found support" for his efforts to add "a paragraph to the Election Law." He said:

"While I was in Turkey, there were 100 deputies who supported me. I believe that number has risen to 150 by now."

Sivgin enumerated the names of some of the deputies who "share his views."

According to Sivgin, "with the new arrangement participation in elections will grow, and the national will be represented better."

We asked:

"Have you discussed this matter with the Prime Minister?"

He answered: "My work goes back to much older dates. I will discuss the matter with the Prime Minister when I return to Turkey."

It appears that a "change in the Election Law" will soon be an item on the political agenda.

In 1961, the electoral system we used for senate elections was different than the one we used for assembly elections.

In 1963, we held local elections.

At that time, we shelved both the electoral systems used in 1961 and used a completely different system.

In 1964, elections were held for part of the senate seats.

"We changed the election system" yet again.

We entered the 1965 general elections with yet another election system, the "national balance."

Part of the senate seats were up for election again in 1966.

The Justice Party government of that time implemented the system used in 1961.

However, the Constitutional Court ruled that "the system of 1961 is unconstitutional" and repealed the changes that were made.

Thus, the system of 1964 was used in the 1966 elections.

The electoral system was changed another time just before the 1969 elections.

The Constitutional Court approved some of the changes and repealed others.

We do not want to bore you with this any longer.

What we are trying to say is that we have turned the electoral system into "a child's practice writing board."

The post-1980 administration had envisaged to have a "single party come out of the ballot box."

In other words, it had in mind a "strong government-strong opposition" model.

The electoral system used in the 1983 elections was, "with very minor differences," the system which Sadettin Bilgic proposed in 1966 but which was not approved by his party and which he explained in length in *MILLIYET* at that time.

In 1983, the MP emerged from the ballot box "with 211 deputies."

The opposition won 188 seats (117 for the Populist Party and 71 for the Nationalist Democracy Party).

Then we arrived in 1986.

Just before the Assembly went into recess, the government party changed the electoral law and introduced the provision that "parties which cannot organize in more than two-thirds of the provinces cannot participate in the elections."

In addition, "bonus seats were provided for the party winning the largest share of the vote."

That automatically raised the "threshold."

However, just before the by-elections of 28 September, the government party introduced another change.

It annulled the change introduced only a few months previously and said: "Everyone can participate in the elections."

Then we arrived in the autumn of 1986.

Once again we are discussing the issue of "changing the electoral law."

In our opinion, the electoral system which Sivgin says "is supported by 100 deputies" has the following characteristics:

1. It places more weight on the name of a candidate.
2. The party of a candidate may be of secondary importance.
3. Independents have a better "chance" of winning.

In other words, candidates have a better chance to wage "personal propaganda" campaigns.

We had a similar implementation for a while in the past and one candidate was successful with his campaign slogan of: "Are you going to vote for the mufti coming out of the mosque or Zuhtu coming out of the wine cellar?"

This is the envisioned new system and slogan.

In attempting to make such changes, our politicians and statesmen often cite examples from the West, particularly from Britain.

However, for some reason they forget that in the West electoral systems are not changed "like changing shirts."

What we are wondering is this:

What are our politicians looking for? What do they want?

Do they want the consolidation of democracy?

Or do they want a magic formula which will ensure their election?

In a country which has not been able to implement the same electoral system "in two elections in a row," our politicians would have a hard time to persuade the people that "they aspire and yearn for democracy."

The idea that "Turkey is not yet ready for democracy" is occasionally spread across the country like a wave and green lights are lit for interventions.

Turkey is ready for democracy.

So long as everyone stops believing in democracy "on condition that it raises them to a certain positions."

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CSO: 3554/126

COMMENTARY SEES CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM IN DOMESTIC POLITICS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 86 p 3

["Article of the Day" column by Oktay Eksi: "A Civilized Step"]

[Text] Yesterday's papers carried a report so short that it was virtually lost in the back pages. The report said that Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and main opposition party (Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP]) leader Erdal Inonu met for 1 hour and 15 minutes at the Prime Ministry. It appears that Ozal informed Inonu about our relations with "Middle Eastern" countries. Inonu reportedly complained about the fact that the issue of lifting the immunity of certain parliamentary deputies is being used as a pressuring device against the opposition. He also asked Ozal to "support his proposal to amend the Constitution" with regard to "those whose political rights are restricted."

For us it is not very important how the two sides responded to each other on the issues discussed. Naturally, on some issues a compromise is possible and on some it is not.

We feel the need to write on this issue because we think that a meeting between the head of the government and the main opposition leader in such a civilized manner is an important matter whose significance cannot be minimized.

One of the most dismaying aspects of Turkish political life has been the fact that the tradition of "compromise" was never established.

Former politicians know the problems that has led to.

Indeed, the mentality that prevailed in the years after 1946 was so warped that the surest way to tarnish an opponent's or opposition party's reputation was to claim that they had talked with the government party. Because such talks were invariably associated with "ulterior motives."

Between 1946 and 1950, when the Democratic Party was in "opposition," it felt hurt most by allegations that "it was consorting with the government." Because then President Ismet Inonu always sought a dialog with the opposition. Indeed, once Inonu brought together then Prime Minister Recep Peker and then opposition leader Celal Bayar in order to prevent tensions between the

government and the opposition and issued a declaration stating the points on which the two sides reached a compromise, the views they defended and the government's opinion. This "document of compromise" in 1947, which has passed into our political history as the "12 July declaration," was immediately exploited by the Nation Party—the other wing of the opposition—which declared that the "Democratic Party has sold out to the government."

This primitive mentality which considers compromise with the government on certain issues as a renunciation of one's own views and a betrayal of one's own programs has been one of the major causes of the frequent jamming of the democratic system. Indeed, one of the common characteristics of the 27 May 1960 and 12 September 1980 interventions is that both interventions took place in a climate where the dialog between the government and the opposition was completely broken.

Mr Turgut Ozal is probably the most tolerant leader of our political history. He neither likes nor is able to cope with the strategy of tension. We are fortunate that Erdal Inonu is a leader whose politics is on the same frequency.

Let us try it; civilized relations may elevate our political life to a higher plane.

9588

CSO: 3554/126

EVREN URGES CLERGY TO SUPPORT FAMILY PLANNING

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Nov 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara--President Kenan Evren said: "Rather than arguing over whether eating honey is pious or sinful, clergymen should devote their energies to thinking about how Muslim countries can rise to the level of developed countries and should enlighten nations on this issue."

The Family Planning Congress sponsored by the Ankara Gynecology Association was held yesterday. President Evren attended the congress and delivered a speech.

Stating that excessive birthrates slow down economic development, Evren urged that the family planning campaign continue with full strength and said: "I pledge to provide all forms of support for this campaign." President Evren said:

"I have always believed that this high birthrate and rapid population growth has played a major role Turkey's slow rate of economic development—or rather its inability to attain the level of development of the advanced countries. That is why I feel duty-bound to attend seminars and meetings on such issues.

Muslim Countries First in High Birthrate

"This issue will certainly play a major role in our attainment of the goals set by Ataturk. In this respect, you, our valuable scientists and physicians, have major obligations.

"We look at the world, we examine the countries with the highest rates of population growth, and we see that Muslim countries are ranked first among these. We therefore conclude that religious pressure on the people plays a role in this phenomenon."

'Is It Pious to Eat Honey?'

Referring to a recent GUNAYDIN report from Paris, Evren said: "At a time when we are stepping into the 21st century, arguments are raging over whether eating honey is pious or sinful. This is happening in a place like Paris. I would like to say something to those clergymen. Rather than arguing over

whether eating honey is pious or sinful, clergymen should devote their energies to thinking about how Muslim countries can rise to the level of developed countries and should enlighten nations on this issue.

"It is such regressive ideas which have brought us to where we are now. Fortunately, the Turkish nation is slowly extricating itself out of this predicament."

Kalemli's Speech

Minister of Health and Social Assistance Mustafa Kalemli said that the family planning campaign has saved the lives of 30,000 children and has prevented 3 million children from contracting diseases.

Kalemli added: "Our goal is to cut the infant mortality rate by 50 percent and the maternal mortality rate from 20 per 10,000 to 15 per 10,000. We are planning to increase the proportion of fertile couples using contraceptive measures from 23 percent to 35 percent."

No Religious Objections to Family Planning

Speaking at the congress, Dr Zein Khairullah, member of the Administrative Council of the World Muslim Scholars' Association, said that there are not religious objections to contraceptive methods. Stating that family planning methods can be used and that religion poses no obstacles against them, Khairullah said: "The main obstacle is the scarcity of knowledge, equipment and health services."

9588

CSO: 3554/131

FORMER RELIGIOUS DIRECTOR SEES EDUCATION AS SOLUTION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 86 pp 3,14

[Ahmet Baydar report]

[Text] Ankara—Lutfu Dogan, a former minister of state and chairman of religious affairs, disclosed his views on reactionarism to MILLIYET and said: "There is a return to the past in Turkey." Dogan insisted that the introduction of mandatory religious education is beneficial and that, however, the mandatory teaching of religion to non-Muslim children is incompatible with secularism and Islam.

Stating that education is the central problem on the issue of reactionarism, Dogan said:

"Turkey is not making any progress on this issue. Turkey's problems were always viewed in a political framework. The governments disregarded the criticisms. I have not made any statements on this issue, which I feel is very important, in order to avoid any emotional responses.

"In my opinion, national education in Turkey must be reexamined in a way that will ensure the country's progress and facilitate unity in education. The Ministry of National Education can easily make decisions on national education issues. The training of religious officers and opening Koranic studies schools are also part of the ministry's responsibilities. Now certain private schools are being opened for religious education. However, the Ministry of National Education is responsible for Koranic studies schools or private religious schools no matter what they are called and regardless of whether they are opened by groups, sects or individuals with special motives. I hear that even municipalities have begun opening Koranic studies schools. Examples of that can be found in Samsun."

Stating that education is the principal issue, Dogan said that Islamic religious education must be viewed indepedently from political considerations. He added:

"If you ask me whether there is 'reactionarism' I would tell you that there is a return to the past. Religious education is not given importance in Turkey. Today, when I look at textbooks supposed to teach religious education, I see that they are teaching ancient cultures. But the truth is that Islam is not conservative."

RETIRING RELIGIOUS DIRECTOR TELLS VIEWS ON FUNDAMENTALISM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 86 pp 3,14

[Yener Susoy report]

[Text] A "merciless" battle has raged between the former Religious Affairs Chairman, Dr Tayyar Altikulac, and SDPP [Social Democratic Populist Party] deputy, Dr Bahriye Ucek, in recent years. Ucek, a former faculty member of the School of Divinity, submitted several proposals to the Assembly for investigations on Altikulac. She accused the Religious Affairs Chairmanship [RAC] with "antiseccular" actions and "corruption."

Yesterday, we spoke with Altikulac who had come to Istanbul to bid farewell to the Istanbul Religious Affairs Organization. Altikulac took off his glasses and spoke out his feelings:

"Because I retired at an early age, even my family is looking for motives. It is clear that the Chairmanship of the RAC is an office that is difficult to execute. I was named acting chairman in 1971 and became the permanent chairman in 1978. I did not come to that office by lobbying. They appointed me even though I did not think I deserved the position. During my 9 years in office, I worked with four governments: Ecevit, Demirel, Uluuu and Ozal. I received cordial attention from all of them."

Altikulac said that he requested twice, from Bulend Uluuu and Turgut Ozal, to retire but that his requests were denied. We asked: "Did your strained relations with Minister of State Kazim Oksay have a role in your request for retirement?" Altikulac replied:

"As with all governments, with this administration too there were occasions when I was at odds with certain political personalities. However, there was no special political reason that forced my retirement."

Response to Ucek

Our conversation eventually turned to Ms Ucek. What was the scope of the investigation launched by Minister of State Mehmet Ozgunes on the RAC? What were the disagreements with the RAC?

Altikulac interrupted us by saying: "This is not a report. It is a memorandum originating from the office of the Deputy Prime Minister." He then took out some files from his briefcase and placed them before us. He continued:

"This memorandum was written on 30 November 1982. It proposes that the finances of the RAC be reviewed or audited. The memorandum was sent by Mr Zeyyad Baykara. A three-member commission examined 123 charges. The Ministry of State ruled in a 2 May 1983 memorandum which was signed by Mehmet Ozgunes and which was recorded in the proceedings of the Assembly that of the 123 charges 109 were totally baseless, one was related to another agency, eight were related to the RAC and five were related to the Turkish Religious Foundation. None of these 14 charges were related to corruption, misappropriation or acts against Ataturk's principles of republicanism and secularism. All of them concerned very minor technical implementation errors."

Then why has SDPP deputy Bahriye Ucek persistently called for the investigation of the RAC? When Altikulac heard her name, he was furious:

"Ms Ucek is not open and candid in her fight. This almost hostile unrelenting pursuit stems from certain resentments."

What type of resentments?

"During my tenure as Chairman of the RAC, Ms Ucek sent us some books for possible inclusion in the RAC's publications. The Higher Council of Religious Affairs reviewed these books and decided that they were not publishable by the RAC because of certain scholarly errors. Ms Ucek deeply resented this episode. Moreover, I pointed out some inconsistencies in a presentation of hers at a seminar in the Ankara School of Divinity during the post-12 September period; she was embarrassed before a select audience. That bitterness has also not healed."

We asked: "Mr Altikulac, it is said that during your tenure as Chairman of the RAC, you sent your father and relatives on pilgrimage free of charge. Does that not constitute favoritism?"

Altikulac replied: "In 1980, we retained three vans for three foreign destinations. These vans did not charge any money. Because of restrictions on pilgrimage travel, the drivers of the vans wanted to go on pilgrimage in exchange for offering the free use of their vans. About a year after this episode, we established family relations with the owner of one of the vans. Had I known that establishing family relations with a citizen who served with his van on a pilgrimage trip would be objectionable, I would not have done it. As for my father, he was a religious officer in the Devrekani district of Kastamonu during our experimental program in 1978. Commissions affiliated with governors' offices recommend to us personnel serving in rural organizations for pilgrimage permits. My father, who had gone on pilgrimage the first year at his own expense, was included among the candidates from Kastamonu. He acted as a bus guide for pilgrims. All these were written in the report and it was proven that the charges about favoritism were fabricated."

Peril of Reactionarism

We asked the retired RAC chairman, who has battled to place "photographs of Ataturk" in Koranic studies schools and Islamic seminaries, to tell us his views on the issue of reactionarism. We asked him if such a peril exists.

"The question of what reactionarism is and what it is not has not yet been clarified. At the one extreme, there are those who see innocent religious expressions, congregations overflowing into the streets and constitutionally mandated religious classes in schools as reactionarism. At the other extreme, there are those who insist in the name of religion that Friday prayers must not be said because this country is not an Islamic country and that paying taxes to the state is not permitted by canon law. I do not believe that we have a religious peril which can pose a threat to the existence of the state, the integrity of the nation and the indivisibility of the country and which can accomplish anything of substance. On the other hand, I do not think that it will not exist in the future."

What measures should be taken? Altikulac enumerated them:

"Our statesmen and politicians should not make any concessions on such issues to serve their own motives. The issue of religion must be dissociated from political maneuvering."

Altikulac added that, while Ataturk's name could not even be mentioned in religious schools before he took office, during his tenure he had photographs of Ataturk placed in all Koranic studies schools and muftis' offices and that he worked vigorously to instill the spirit of "Ataturkism" in the lower cadres. We asked:

"Mr Altikulac, how can we teach Ataturk better to our clergymen? How can we make them love our great liberator?"

"This is an issue that concerns our national education system. The whole issue begins in the schools. Topics on Ataturk must be more rigorously taught at Islamic seminaries and schools of divinity. I can state confidently that today the allegation that 'religious officers are enemies of Ataturk'—which used to be uttered very convincingly in the past—is no longer valid with respect to the RAC. All our religious officers must not forget that the venue of our duties is the Turkish Republic Ataturk gave to us."

As soon as he had finished his remarks, Dr Altikulac said "I must be going" and departed for Ankara.

Since Altikulac has so much affection for Ataturk in his heart, perhaps he should be assigned to teach a course entitled "Ataturk and Our Religion" at a school of divinity. What do you think, Mr Emiroglu?

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM EXAMINED IN ATATURKIST CONTEXT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 2

[Article by Professor Toktamis Ates: "What Kind of Ataturkists Are These People?"]

[Text] Attitudes toward Ataturk and Ataturkism in today's Turkey can be divided in three groups: Those are Ataturkists, those who are not Ataturkists and those who are opposed to Ataturk. Such a diverse range of approaches is in fact natural in a pluralist and liberal democracy. Everyone can hold a different view on any issue, and that should not be condemned or cause aggravation.

However, in today's Turkey, whenever "declarations" on Ataturk and Ataturkism are at issue, the three-way split mentioned above disappears and everyone becomes an Ataturkist. Such an attitude is compatible with neither a pluralist democracy nor human dignity. Ironically, in today's Turkey those who deliver the most moving speeches on Ataturkism are not the Ataturkists but those who oppose Ataturk. Moreover, they do that—shamelessly and without embarrassment—not by trying to modify their views to conform with Ataturk's, but by distorting Ataturk's views to fit theirs.

Ataturk did not live on the moon. What he did, wrote and said are well known. His fundamental ideas harbor no inconsistencies, even though, as a rational and pragmatic statesman, he occasionally took varying stances in the face of changing conditions. Ataturkism means sharing these fundamental ideas and endorsing Ataturk's fundamental principles. One cannot be an Ataturkist simply by saying, "I am an Ataturkist." That way one can only be ridiculous.

However, phony Ataturkists in Turkey have begun to become dangerous rather than ridiculous. Having realized that they cannot accomplish anything by opposing Ataturk, they have begun distorting Ataturk's views to fit their own views while trying to discredit Ataturk slowly. Ataturk's stance with regard to religion is clear. In an interview with the correspondent of VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG, published in Volume 73 of AYIN TARIHI [History of the Month] in 1930, Ataturk said (from "His Speeches and Statements III", No. 85/85):

"I ordered the translation of the Koran. It is being translated into Turkish for the first time. I also ordered the translation of a book on the life Muhammad. The people should know that there is a recurring phenomenon and that religious dignitaries have no objective other than filling their own stomachs."

More than half a century after the declaration of the Turkish republic, young women wish to attend Republic Day ceremonies with their heads covered, and when they are not allowed to do so they exit the arena collectively. One wishes that they were allowed to attend. What would be so offensive about girls with covered heads in a nationally-televised ceremony in the capital where the anniversary of the republic was marked with an Ottoman marching band before national and foreign officials? The anniversaries of the conquest of Istanbul, the battle of Malazgirt and the Mohac campaign are marked with Ottoman marching bands, but what was the Ottoman marching band doing in the celebration of the anniversary of the republic? A friend who works at the Foreign Ministry explained: "The foreign envoys like it very much. They think it is very original." Of course they like it. They would even like a gypsy song and dance group in Sulukule. In addition, YOK [Higher Education Council] introduced the most Atatürkist solution to this issue! YOK ruled that head covers are banned in universities and that turbans are allowed. According to this ruling, girls who wear head covers are anti-Atatürk while those wear turbans are devoted Atatürkists. (Probably girls who smoke rolled cigarettes are the most devoted Atatürkists.)

He Was Uncompromising Over Independence

Atatürk was a statesman who did not make the slightest concession on the principle of "full independence." He was extremely sensitive on the issue of independence not only in the political but also in economic and cultural domains. Because he knew that political independence is impossible without economic independence. In those days, all European banks had branches in Istanbul, while "smart alecks" roamed the streets saying: "What does pulling yourself by your own bootstraps mean? What does economic independence mean?" Meanwhile in Ankara, brave and honorable men were working under dim gas lights to draw up plans for lighting a fully independent Turkey.

Atatürk's Turkey, which opposed all forms of imperialism, which "organized a national resistance" against imperialism and which won its independence with blood and fire, set an example to all the oppressed nations of the world. How can those who aspire today to become a South Korea, Singapore or Hong Kong be Atatürkists?

Atatürk was extremely respectful and sensitive toward the nation's will and the Turkish Grand National Assembly formed by that national will even though experiments with the multiparty system failed during his lifetime. Since we have written about this issue in several articles, we will not repeat the examples here. However, we cannot resist pointing to an important issue. In his aforementioned interview with the correspondent of VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG, Atatürk said: "I am definitely not a dictator. Go and ask the guard at the door and see if he is afraid of me." He continued: "Because one cannot govern through fear." How can some of today's Turkish leaders who carry big sticks under their robes and who are always intent on instilling fear be Atatürkists?

Sense of Nationhood

Atatürk was not only the leader of the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic; he also instilled the sense of nationhood in the Turkish people. He fostered a unifying and integrating sense of nationalism which did not

discriminate on the basis of religion, language or race. [He said:] Everyone who lives in the Turkish Republic and has ties of citizenship with it is a Turk. It was the most progressive concept of nationalism in its time. Ataturk did not say, "how fortunate it is to be a Turk" or "how fortunate it is to be born a Turk." He said: "How fortunate it is to say one is a Turk." Ataturkism is "modernism," "unity," "integrity," "independence," "faith" and "confidence." Ataturkism is love. How can analyzers of skulls and religious nationalists be Ataturkists?

At the beginning of this article, I mentioned that Ataturk's opponents are trying to discredit Ataturk while attempting to create a distorted image of Ataturk. It is true that some people who do not dare to oppose Ataturk think that they are discrediting Ataturk by glorifying the things he opposed and abolished. A sinister propaganda is being waged under the slogan of "claiming ownership of our history." The idea of having an Ottoman marching band in Republic Day ceremonies is part of this campaign. What else can they be trying to do by glorifying the sultans Abdulhamit and Vahdettin? Do not the history books write how much of the territory of the Ottoman Empire were lost under Abdulhamit, who harshly oppressed the intellectuals while opening schools in a display of self-contradiction? Did not this person surrender to Germany long before Enver Pasa did? Was it not Vahdettin's cursed hand which signed the death warrants for Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues who were fighting for the nation's existence in Anatolia?

We would like to underscore one last issue in this article. This is a clear indication of where we have come with implementations which revise all social arrangements in the name of Ataturkism. A children's magazine published in Istanbul and recommended for schools by the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports says the following with regard to the Battle of Canakkale [Dardanelles]: "The Turkish victory in Canakkale gained certainty on 18 March 1915. The enemy fled faster than it came in. Mustafa Kemal fought in Canakkale together with thousands of our officers. He performed his duties like everyone else." The author of these lines is more reactionary and ungrateful than the Ottoman Empire for which he pines so much. According to this author, Mustafa Kemal, whom the entire nation—including the Sultan—admired at the time as the "hero of the Anafartalar" and who shined like a star of hope in those dark and despairing days of the war, "did his duty like everyone else." How can the Ministry of National Education recommend this magazine to schools? How can the members of the commissions who issue such recommendations have the audacity to claim that they are Ataturkists?

At a time when the youth, which is the country's most important assurance against reactionarism, is sitting in the defendant's dock and is required to take interest in nothing but academics, it is a great contradiction to warn in public squares that "reactionarism is being resurrected." There is a severe confusion of concepts in high places where the aroma of whisky mingles with that of rose water. However, there is nothing to be concerned about. Because just as one cannot be an Ataturkist simply by saying "I am an Ataturkist," one cannot distort Ataturk's views. As they wring their hands believing that they have "finished their work," those who think that they are very clever will begin looking for holes to hide when Ataturk's voice of enlightenment once again rises to the skies through the mouths of Ataturk's youth.

HEAD COVER ISSUE REPORTED GROWING

Polarizing Students, Staff, Administration

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Nov 86 p 12

[Text] The debate between turbaned university students and faculty members and school administrators is growing. The practice of suppressing turbans, which has also split the students, is reportedly preparing the grounds for anarchy in the universities. Meanwhile, students who had requested an extension of their visas in accordance with Article 44 of the Higher Education Council code of regulations, began to act collectively.

According to a report from our Erzurum bureau, the plots staged against turbans in the School of Science and Literature at Ataturk University have now spread to the School of Agriculture. Turbaned students are refused admission to the university campus, the building housing the president's office, the library and certain classes.

Preparing Grounds for Anarchy

Meanwhile, it was learned that Assistant Professor Muhlis Koca of the Physics Department of the School of Science and Literature said during a conversation with faculty members before the present "turban disaster" at the school that he is "opposed to turbans" and that he argued with Deputy Assistant Professor Yusuf Sahin.

It is also reported that the investigation on Deputy Assistant Professor Irfan Batat may take too much time. Dr Batat insulted student Zuhul Cinar, the daughter of Correct Way Party's Erzurum Provincial leader Turan Cinar, by telling her in the class: "Are you dressing this way because someone may rape you?"

Moreover, it is reported that one of the members of the commission set up to investigate the turban question stated a priori that he opposes all forms of turbans.

Ahmet Cakir, the dean of the School of Science and Literature at Ataturk University, said: "We are permitting the turban, but we are hesitating on the form of the turban." Meanwhile, divisions have begun to emerge among the

students of the school. It is reported that disputes between those who support students wearing turbans and those who oppose them are intensifying.

Incidents in Bursa

Meanwhile, our Bursa bureau reports that the turban issue is once again causing controversy at the schools of medicine, divinity, education and economics and administration of the Uludag University.

Over 100 female students who had submitted photographs of themselves wearing turbans for their school identity cards, were asked by school officials to have their pictures taken without turbans.

Reacting to this demand by the school administration, the students collectively laid wreaths at the Ataturk Monument and observed a minute of silence. Later, the students tried to submit a petition to Bursa Governor Zekai Gumus. However, the students returned from the governor's office empty-handed and issued the following statement:

"The turbans we wear is nobody's business. We have been wearing turbans for years. People recognize us with our turbans. If we have our pictures taken without turbans, no one would recognize us. This pressure is too much."

Petition with 1,127 Signatures

Meanwhile, students have begun protesting the refusal of the Uludag University's secretariat to process a petition carrying 1,127 signatures requesting the extension of visas at schools affiliated with the University. The students said: "They are laying the groundwork for the failure and expulsion of thousands of students."

Describing their predicament as "pitiful", the students said:

"We submitted to the university secretariat a petition carrying 1,127 signature and requested the extension of visas. However, the petition was not processed. This provision works against us. What are the prospects for a student who fails twice in a row in the same course and gets expelled from the school? Because the visas are not extended, we have friends who are forced to take four examinations in a single day. Moreover, the university does not provide us with any facilities. Transportation is our principal problem. Under current conditions, Uludag University can train only a 'hitchhiker generation.' At the Gorukle campus, nearly 30 students are forced to stand up in all classes. In dining rooms, only the strong students can manage to eat. Let those who state 'we have provided every facility to the students' say 'all these are for you.' The Uludag University is stirring. We do not want to experience a repetition of the Ankara incidents in Bursa."

[Box, p 12] 'Repression of Moral Values May Cause Crisis'

Dr Hasan Ulvi Kivanc, the head of the Psychiatric Division of Numune Hospital, stated that taking a hard stance against the students' way of dress without any legal basis and causing dichotomies is nothing but provoking anarchy. Kivanc said:

"The foundations of a person's character are formed during his first 7 years. During that period the person's psyche develops certain elements and functions known as subego, ego and superego. What is known as superego is shaped and transformed by parental and social value judgements which incorporate conscientious and moral values such as customs, traditions and religion. During the first year of childhood, the child's reactions are shaped by self-gratification. Consequently, the child determines right and wrong, good or bad by his instinctive gratification. Beginning with his second year, a child begins to understand value judgements about good, bad, right and wrong coming from his environment. However, he does not accept those values at that stage. The child learns about what is right and what is wrong and begins to build a personality by seeing, experiencing and copying the conditions of his life. The sense of shame plays a major role in the development of this personality and particularly the superego. These shaped elements of ego eventually solidify and form the psychological essence of that person.

"The conscientious and moral values which form the essence of this consolidated ego and superego can no longer be altered. If one attempts to alter them through coercion, one may cause severe crises and psychological internal conflicts. The mode of dress, which stems from customs, traditions and beliefs, must be in harmony with the ego and the superego.

"If universities attempt to change the students' mode of dress which conform with legal and secular standards through coercion and threats and particularly by insulting and degrading remarks, the students—who are developing their personalities and trying to pursue their education under already difficult conditions—may lose their will and self-respect and may face severe problems by losing their respect and confidence in their teachers and school administration. Humiliation and degradation for their beliefs, conscience and personality before their peers will traumatize students psychologically and may bring them to the brink of more severe psychological disorders.

"The second major drawback of undermining freedom of belief and conscience in universities is that discriminating among students—who are studying in a spirit of unity, love and brotherhood in peaceful schools—and dividing them on the basis of their way of dress without any legal basis can serve no purpose other than provoking them to engage in anarchy."

Teacher Investigated for Refusal

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Nov 86 p 12

[Text] Edremit—An investigation has been launched on a teacher wearing head cover at the Edremit Girls' Vocational School.

Refika Kara, a trainee home economics teacher, refused to comply with requests by school administrators to remove her head cover in classrooms.

The school administration referred the issue to the district office. Refika Kara refused to comply with the orders of the district office as well. The investigation of Kara is continuing.

SOVIET TRADE DELEGATE PUGIN PUSHES FOR INCREASED IMPORTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Jan 87 p 34

[Article: "V.D. Pugin Proposes Joint Venture for Trade with Soviets Involving Services"]

[Text] Soviet trade delegate V.D. Pugin has demanded that the structure of Soviet exports to Finland be decisively changed.

In Pugin's opinion, Finland has opportunities to import more in many business sectors. He has proposed the establishment of a joint venture company to handle the exporting and importing of licenses, technical know-how and engineer, planning and consulting services.

Trade problems between the two countries these past few years stemming from drops in the price of oil are, according to Pugin, clearcut grounds for a change in structure. Pugin spoke in Helsinki on Thursday. He emphasized how important the political factor is in organizing serious economic cooperation.

"In long-range predictions regarding oil prices it is generally estimated that the price will scarcely rise above \$18, at least not before 1995. Thus both a solution to the temporary disparity problem and the later prospects for improving trade relations are to a large extent dependent on the diversification of the structure of Soviet exports and on the application of new kinds of economic relations differing from the traditional ones," Pugin said.

"Finland could also import new kinds of services from the Soviet Union that relate to the peaceful use of space," Pugin said.

11,466

CSO: 3617/49

PAPER VIEWS IMPACT OF SOVIETS' NEW POLICIES ON TRADE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Inger Jagerhorn: "New Features In Soviet Trade"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Efforts towards innovation in Soviet foreign trade will help offset the worrisome decline in Soviet-Finnish trade, writes Inger Jagerhorn in today's first editorial.

There was a great deal of unusual pomp surrounding the signing of this year's Soviet-Finnish trade protocol. Present was not just Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Aristov but the Soviet head of government Nikolai Ryshkov as well.

Normally there is a great deal of ceremony when five-year agreements on general principles are reached. The yearly protocols are treated with somewhat less magnificence.

But this time the ceremonies surrounding the trade protocol were particularly splendid. It is certainly not unusual for high-level official visits to be combined with the signing of some suitable agreement. Nevertheless one may still wonder if there was a special thought behind giving such prominence today to our mutual trade in such a visible manner. The answer is presumably that there was.

We in Finland have clearly not been alone in the disquiet we have felt over the major decline in our exports to the Soviet Union for which the decline in the price of oil has been responsible. The Soviets, for their part, have strongly emphasized that the level of trade should not be allowed to decline. There is on both sides a strongly pronounced political willingness to solve problems, look for new avenues, and thus maintain the level.

Finnish disquiet over the decline is easy to understand--exports to the Soviet Union account for 20 percent of our total exports. The amount of exports in the five-year agreement now in force was calculated on the basis of an oil price of \$28 per barrel, but in 1986 this price was between \$13 and \$14. The consequences of this equation are easy to comprehend.

But what special conditions are there in the Soviet Union which make it emphasize so strongly the importance of its trade with Finland, which even

when all is said and done, is like a flea on an elephant's back?

This question can be seen against the background of economic reforms now in progress in the Soviet Union.

Intensive work is underway to reorganize Soviet foreign trade and overall to achieve greater efficiency for the activity of Soviet ventures. This is clearly a process during which there will be experimentation, a search for new models, and a search for new stimuli.

Indeed it is not only possible, it is also plausible that in this respect Finland will have an extremely suitable cooperative partner. It is a small neighboring country with a Western market economy with which the Soviet Union has long had relations which were stable and full of confidence, both politically and economically speaking. It is a country which, given current conditions, has a pressing need to look for new ways to maintain a high level of trade.

Though small, Finland is the Soviet Union's second largest Western trading partner after West Germany. Soviet leaders regularly visit here and are frequent visitors with our business leaders, with whom they enjoy cordial relations.

All this certainly explains not only head of government Ryshkov's presence here this week, it also explains two innovations contained in this year's Soviet-Finnish trade protocol.

For the first time the Soviet Union will establish a joint venture with a Western firm. Finnair will work on a Moscow hotel project with a Soviet partner. One additional joint venture is under discussion. Initial difficulties were great because there is no Soviet legislation on the subject, but on the other hand such a model effort simply cannot be allowed to turn out badly.

The second innovation is that for the first time there is consensus on a form of compensatory trade, the sort of cooperative venture in which the investment costs in a factory are paid for in the form of goods from that factory which are then sold to a third country.

For the Soviet Union this project will be a test of the degree to which it can reduce the role of the bureaucracy and increase flexibility in business and industry. That this is the object can also be seen from the fact that in the protocol the Soviet Union has included new goods which were originally held for other purposes.

Prime Minister Ryshkov himself has emerged as a forceful spokesman for the new economic policy. Thus far his statements have been of a fairly general sort. When the first specific steps are actually made in the area of foreign trade, Finland will be the copartner in both instances.

Further details concerning conditions of the agreement about joint ventures have not yet been publicized. Reservations which Finland might have had

previously--as well as the risks of being a "guinea pig"--seem largely to have disappeared.

There may still be every reason to note that we have once again had luck with us with regard to trade with the Soviets. First, it helps us at a time when economic conditions in the West are poor and now, when there are strong declining trends, Soviet interest in new economic policy helps improve these conditions.

Now might be the right time to give thought to the creation of an institute for East-West trade which would examine and further expand new trends. Why not use the president's official residence at Tamminiemi for this? That would really be a concrete, practical mark of respect to President Kekkonen's achievements in the area of Soviet-Finnish trade.

12789

CSO: 3650/63

IMPACT OF SOVIET TRADE ON ECONOMY VIEWED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Jan 87 p 10

[Article: "Exports To Soviet Union Provide 140,000 Jobs"]

[Text] (FINNISH NEWS BUREAU) Despite trade problems with the Soviet Union brought about by lower energy prices, investments made in export projects in the past ten years of high oil prices have been advantageous for Finland.

This emerges from a report on the importance of Soviet trade for Finland's national economy which Etila, the Business and Trade Research Institute, published on Monday.

Exports to the Soviet Union increased revenues into the national economy. By the middle of the decade, exports to the Soviet Union provided employment for a total of 140,000 people as contrasted with approximately 50,000 at the beginning of the 1970's.

Since employment stagnated after the mid-1970's, it was largely owing to [word illegible] exports to the Soviet Union that employment still remained satisfactory, the report stated. Furthermore, exports to the Soviet Union have been concentrated in labor-intensive industries such as the metal and textiles and ready-made clothing industries.

Need To Import

According to the report, exports to the Soviet Union are the reason imports are by and large needed to the same extent as other exports. Since exports to the West require more energy than those to the Soviet Union, they nevertheless presuppose even greater imports from the Soviet Union than exports to it would.

Today the metal industry represents the biggest net export revenues in trade with the Soviet Union, while forestry still accounts for the biggest revenues in trade with the West.

12789

CSO: 3650/63

FINLAND ONLY NORDIC COUNTRY WITH INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jan 87 p 23

[Text] Finland is the only Nordic country in which employment is declining. According to a Statistics Center survey, comparatively viewed, during the first half of last year the number of employed workers increased most in Denmark and Norway in comparison with the same period of the previous year. In Sweden the number of employed workers increased more slowly, but in Finland it declined slightly.

The number of employed workers in Denmark rose 4.6 percent, in Norway 3.6 percent and in Sweden 0.9 percent. The number of employed workers declined in Finland by about 9,000.

In Norway and Sweden the number of employed workers increased most in the private sector service industries, which include trade, the hotel and restaurant industry, transportation and bank operations, among others. The number of workers in industry also clearly increased in Norway and to some extent in Sweden. In Denmark too, to a considerable extent in the private sector service industries, but the biggest increase was in industry and construction activities.

Finnish Farm Workers Laid Off

In Finland the decline in the number of employed workers was chiefly due to reductions in the number of farm and forest economy workers, whereas the number of employed workers did not significantly change in the other industries.

The increase in the number of public administration and service workers that had been going on for a long time seems to have come to a stop when we look at the Nordic countries as a whole. The number of employed workers increased most in Denmark and to some extent in Finland too, but in Sweden and even more clearly so in Norway the number of employed workers began to decline in comparison with the first half of 1985.

Youth Unemployment Highest in Finland

With the exception of Finland, the number of unemployed workers declined in the Nordic countries in comparison with the first half of 1985.

The number of unemployed workers declined most in Denmark, over 40,000, but the country's unemployment rate of 8.6 percent was still the highest in the Nordic countries. Norway's unemployment rate was 1.8 percent and Sweden's 2.6 percent.

In Finland the number of unemployed workers increased by 20,000 and the unemployment rate was 7.2 percent. Without those receiving unemployment compensation, it was 5.7 percent.

Unemployment among young people increased, at least in Finland. The rate of unemployment among young people of 11.1 percent in Finland was the highest in the Nordic countries. In Denmark the rate of unemployment among young people was 10.1 percent and 5.3 percent in Sweden and Norway.

11,466

CSO: 3617/49

BRIEFS

FIBER OPTIC CABLE MANUFACTURING--According to a proposal by the Ministry of National Economy, which is already under study for implementation, it is expected that fiber optic cables will be manufactured in Greece as well. Deputy Minister of National Economy Roumeliotis announced that the fiber optic cable that will be manufactured by the proposed unit will be of high quality, will fulfill international requirements and offer good prospects for filling the needs of the Greek market and for export to countries in the Middle East and Africa. Mr Roumeliotis stated that the investment for this project is considered a preventive one that our country must make if we are not to lose ground in the technological development in this sector. It is envisioned that investments will reach 371 million drachmas. [Excerpts] [Athens I AVGI in Greek 30 Jan 87 p 11] /12858

CSO: 3521/82

ANDREOTTI OUTLINES AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

100 Million Dollars to Tunisia

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 22 Oct 86 p 5

[Text] "The agreement that we have undersigned is the symbol of our cooperation," said Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti turning to his Tunisian colleague, Hedi Mabrouk, on the occasion of the signing of the agreement, which took place yesterday morning at the Villa Madama, in which Italy grants a credit of \$100 million in aid to Tunisia.

According to a bulletin from the Farnesina the money is intended for the financing, through purchases made in Italy, of projects within the scope of the agricultural development program at present in effect in that country.

Earthquake Aid to El Salvador

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 22 Oct 86 p 5

[Text] Aid to face the emergency, but also assistance directed towards the reconstruction of the country: this was the way in which the foreign minister characterized the Italian intervention on behalf of El Salvador the day after the recent earthquake. "Italian aid one of the fastest and most effective," was the determination by those responsible for international and American humanitarian organizations. This aid allows, among other things, for the implementation of a housing construction program at a cost of \$10 million, half of which is to be borne by the Department for Cooperation and Development of the Farnesina. Based on requests by Salvadoran authorities, the foreign minister had arranged immediately after the earthquake to send four planes, two C-130s which besides transporting medical supplies, food, and sanitation equipment to the Civil Protection personnel in El Salvador also carried--from Mexico City--medical supplies from the Mexican government plus technicians capable of operating equipment for providing drinking water. A third "DC-130" carried tents and blankets from Italy, while a "DC-8" brought 40 tons of baby food.

As soon as the stage of emergency aid that had been put into effect at the request of Salvadoran authorities and based on indications from international organization was over, the Italian government turned to the next intermediate

phase. This is the perspective in which the Foreign Minister Andreotti concluded an agreement with the new representative for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), William Draper--whom he met last Saturday--concerning Italy's contribution along with that of the UNDP for a housing program for earthquake victims which will cost \$10 million. The implementation of such a program will be entrusted to non-governmental organizations.

Referring to this housing program Andreotti said, "We are dealing with an initiative which will ensure the necessary union between emergency intervention and the next structural stage, a follow-up which is indispensable for making certain that international solidarity in the face of natural disasters does not become lost in initiatives destined to have no effect on the future of populations which are the victims of such disasters."

220 Billion in Foreign Aid

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 22 Oct 86 p 5

[Text] The Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti presided yesterday at the Villa Madama over an interministerial committee for economic foreign policy (CIPES) to examine problems related to cooperation with developing countries. The principal items on the agenda were the determination of the amounts and distribution of voluntary contributions intended for international organizations mainly involved in the area of cooperation for development, and the approval of specific cooperation initiatives for implementing on a bilateral plan, Italian participation in the VII Conference for the re-establishment of financial resources for the Agency for International Development (IDA).

According to a bulletin, the committee considered the granting of about 220 thousand million lire in support of the activities of international organizations among which the principal beneficiaries of such contributions represented on the agenda were the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (PAM), the Consultant Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the International Center for Scientific Culture in Geneva, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Agency for Aid to Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNIDO), the International Red Cross Committee (CICR), the United Nations Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA), and the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in Trieste.

In considering the distribution, the committee adhered to a criterion of predominant concentration with the purpose of attaining greater effectiveness in participation that would benefit above all organizations operating in priority areas for Italian cooperation. About 60 percent of the total available was concentrated on the first 3 international organizations mentioned above.

Furthermore, CIPES approved the financing by a cooperative fund, with a gross value of over 40 thousand million lire, of the following 7 programs: a pilot plant exploiting solar energy for the conservation and transport of fish coming from lake-side waters in the Kerio Valley in Kenya; the renovation and modernization of the Tiper refinery in Tanzania to upgrade the treatment plants which provide crude oil to the country following the evolution which has taken place in the petroleum market during recent years; the construction of four plants for processing rice in Zambia, so as to create immediate markets for local production by exploiting the small lakes existing in the hills; for the irrigation of outlying areas destined to supply farm land in the region of Tangiers, Morocco; for the refinancing of a center for professional development in the textile sector of Casablanca in Morocco; for technical assistance to the National Institute of Argentina for the creation of a laboratory capable of developing to an adequate technological level nonharmful testing for industrial purposes; for an initiative, in collaboration with the Minister of Indonesian Cooperatives, to develop a unified fishing industry at the cooperative level.

As to Italian participation in the VIII IDA Conference, the interministerial committee hoped for a consolidation, and where possible, a reinforcement of Italy's presence in the World Bank. In view of the VIII Conference for the re-establishment of financial resources, the committee took note of indications given by the Treasury Under-Secretary, the Honorable Fracanzani, concerning favorable first contacts intended to achieve precisely such a result.

13062/12851
CSO: 3528/32

EFIM EXPECTED TO PROFIT IN 2 YEARS

Rome IL MESSAGERO in Italian 22 Oct 86 p 21

[Text] EFIM will reduce its losses next year to zero and in 1988 will turn a profit in 1988 (80 thousand million lire to become 200 thousand million lire the following year). Stefano Sandri, president of the third sector of public administration, yesterday put forward these figures before the Bicameral Commission for the Ministry of Government Holdings.

After years of losses, EFIM is now preparing to move out of a long period of crisis. It went from a deficit of 784 thousand million lire in 1983 to one of 486 thousand million lire last year, and a further 30 percent reduction is forecast for 1986. The same financial obligations--said Sandri--have had less impact on production, decreasing from 18.2 percent in 1984 to 10.6 percent this year with a forecast of 6.5 percent in 1987, EFIM is counting on investing another 1,400 thousand million lire, of which 35 percent will be invested in southern Italy.

However, this has not yet resolved all of EFIM's problems, the first being that of aluminum which forms the main division of the Mcs holding company. In any case, Sandri is aiming at raising more capital that will reduce the financial obligations of the sector which have declined from the high point of 30 percent of production cost reached during the 2-year period 1983-1984 to a figure of 9 percent this year.

The best prospects are in the aeronautic industry, even though the danger that Agusta (helicopters) might leave the group to join the IRI seems, at least for the moment, to be overcome.

Meanwhile, Darida, the Minister of Government Holdings, is preparing to complete the administrative restructuring of EFIM. In essence, this means integrating the board of directors (which on the basis of the new statute goes from 9 to 11 members) and nominating the presidential committee. This organization, which does not yet exist for EFIM, by law includes President Sandri (PSDI), and the Socialist Mancini (PSI). Of the other three seats available, the Christian Democrats have a claim on two of them, and either they or the liberals would have to relinquish one seat. An agreement would now have to be reached and the sacrifice would have to come from the liberals. Messina and Padua would have to be the two Christian Democrats

to sit on the presidential committee and Moschi the Republican, even though a few other names are being circulated.

For the ENI board, there may be nothing more to be done: Grignaschi the Liberal would leave the vice presidency to Barbaglia, a Christian Democrat. In this way, De Mita would relinquish having two men on the inside of the organization presided over by the Socialist Reviglio. Bernardini would take the Social Democrat seat left by the recently deceased Adami, and Cagliari (PSI) would be confirmed.

13062/12851

CSO: 3528/32

INFLATION STATISTICS SHOW LOWER RATE IN 1986

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Jan 87 p 2

[Text] The National Institute of Statistics (INE) announced yesterday that prices in Portugal, excluding housing, increased 11.7 percent in 1986 compared to 1985. According to the CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, a monthly publication of INE, this level of inflation was due to substantially lower increases in some index categories, particularly in "foods and beverages" and "miscellaneous." So, while in 1985, compared to 1984, the categories "foods and beverages" and "miscellaneous" increased 17.7 and 21.9 percent respectively, in 1986, compared to 1985, those increases were just 9.1 and 14.5 percent, respectively.

It was a different case in the "clothing and shoes" category, which, in 1985, compared to 1984, increased 23.3 percent and which, in 1986, compared to 1985, increased 23.5 percent.

In monthly terms, the increase in prices registered in December 1986, compared to November of the same year, was 1.7 percent (compared to an equal 1.7 percent in the same period of 1985.)

Industrial Production

The INE announced that the annual index of industrial production went up 9.44 percent in September 1986, compared to the same month the preceding year. The figures from the National Institute of Statistics show an increase of 38.13 percent in the index compared to August. They further show that the January to September average, compared to the identical average for the comparable months of 1985, registered a rise of 4.91 percent. The increase in the first nine months of 1986 was, however, just 1.36 percent.

In sector terms, the values for average variation in the index of industrial production between January and September are low: a decrease of 1.10 and 2.53 percent, respectively, for the extracting industry and electricity and gas, and an increase of 1.87 percent in the transformational industries. Still on the sector level, the extracting industry is the one showing the worst results: the index of production in September 1986, compared with the same month the year before, decreased 17.20 percent, in spite of an increase of 7.09 percent compared to August. Also, the percentage variation between January and September 1987 [sic] and the same period the year before was negative (-9.95 percent.)

For the transformational industries, the percentages are all positive: the increase of 41.67 percent between August and September made possible a rise of 10.55 points compared to September 1985. Furthermore, it made it possible for the average to increase 4.69 percent.

9895/9738

CSO: 3542/41

MILITIA UNITS TRAIN FOR URBAN WARFARE IN STEIERMARK

Vienna DER SOLDAT in German 19 Nov 86 p 10

[Article by Lt Col Dieter Neumann: "Urban Warfare Training Facility Opened in Styria"]

[Text] Div Gen [Maj Gen] Hubert Albrecht, the military commander of Styria, opened the Poels house-to-house fighting training center in the presence of numerous invited guests from public life, government agencies, and representatives of the BMLV [Ministry of Defense], as well as officers from the 5th Command Area.

Specifically, the military commander welcomed the 1st State Assembly President Franz Wegart, an honorary member of the Styria Military Command and a long supporter of all Styrian soldiers, as well as the deputy state bureau president, the director of civil defense and national defense of the Styrian state government, the Bezirk chiefs of Leizen, Graz and environs, Feldbach, Leibnitz, and Radkersburg, as well as the State Gendarmerie [National Police] commander, the director of security for Styria, and the Leoben police chief. More than 100 persons had accepted the military commander's invitation and thus not only displayed their interest in a special training facility devoted to our army's militia system but also revealed the constantly growing bonds between the public and the Austrian Federal Army.

The Poels Urban Warfare Training Facility is the fourth in the Federal Army and by virtue of its type, combines all past lessons learned in the course of construction and practical training. The facility at the Poels GU Pl [Territorial Training Center] is about 20 km south of Graz, in the area of the community of Poels and Zwaring near Wildon. The training area was named "Muehlried" after the local terrain features. The five practice houses, which have so far been erected in the basic model, were supplemented by two other training houses.

The installation, so to speak, is a partly destroyed town center and can be expanded and enlarged if necessary. The Styria Military Command has already installed a personnel barrier and a tank barrier in this training facility.

The construction of the Urban Warfare Training Facility took a year and was accomplished under the direction of the special deputy for construction of

the Quartermaster Department, Styria Military Command, in cooperation with the Army Construction and Surveying Bureau, by six Styrian firms.

The Urban Warfare Training Facility has many purposes. It was basically built to impart to military personnel the ability and skills to fight in built-up terrain. In the context of area defense, combat operations will have to be carried out not only in covered and mountainous terrain but also very often in built-up areas; considering winter-time conditions, built-up areas play a by no means minor role in preserving the combat effectiveness of the units involved.

The skills to be taught the soldiers consist of climbing exercises on building facades and roofs, getting over walls and rubble areas all the way to moving through sewer pipes. Moreover, the soldiers are being trained to operate not only as Rangers but also as members of a team, section, or platoon. The way the commander issues his orders and leads his troops assumes special significance here.

Success can be achieved only through personal resoluteness and reliable and exemplary leadership.

Urban warfare demands a high degree of physical dexterity, rapid recognition of the prevailing situation, and quick reaction leading to correct combat action.

Because of these requirements, the training course cannot be short. It takes several training courses and a corresponding period of time to get to the point where both the commanders and the soldiers can apply what they learned in an urban warfare practice situation.

Following a welcome address and a briefing by the military commander, the inaugural program featured a practice demonstration on the individual objects and an assault by a reinforced light infantry platoon to seize a town by way of a combat exercise. Lt Col Dieter Neumann of the Styria Military Command was responsible for the planning and direction of the demonstration exercise illustrating training procedures for urban warfare.

The demonstration units consisted of the EF of the ET X/85 [expansion unknown] of the 54th LWSR [Militia Depot Regiment] and a light infantry platoon from the 55th LWSR, consisting of LW [Home Guard] personnel from ET IV/86.

The invited guests were impressed by the demonstrations on the climbing facade in all possible variations, using ladders, ropes, via lightning rods and balconies, the exercises involving the hurling of munitions into objects, crossing a building roof, as well as fighting in an object after a helicopter landing on the roof through the stories of the house down into the basement, in a realistic fashion.

The assault by the light infantry platoon on the town, supported by pyrotechnical artillery and mortar fire, the illustration of a house on fire, and an

AT team knocking out an enemy armored vehicle, as well as the employment of practice ammunition generated much smoke, fire, and noise.

The Military Command's intention to explain the purpose of an urban warfare training facility and demonstrating the significance of urban warfare training was carried successfully and aroused interest in the executive sector and the Military Command itself; the unit involved wound up with an above-average well-trained Home Guard light infantry platoon as well as a platoon of future military officers who will be capable of passing this training on.

The demonstration and opening of the Poels urban warfare training facility ended satisfactorily for the Styria Military Command as the urban fighters made their report to the military commander in the presence of the invited guests, followed by a reception.

5058

CSO: 3620/133

BODY ARMOR FOR ALL SERVICES; NAVY HELICOPTER TRAINING IN UK

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jan 87 p 2

[Text] Military personnel of the three services of the Bundeswehr [West German Armed Forces], which are exposed to direct weapon effects on the battlefield without armor protection, are being equipped with body armor. According to an announcement by the Defense Ministry on Wednesday, it is expected that the danger of being wounded can thus be considerably reduced.

About 80 percent of the dead and wounded during wars over the past 40 years were hit by fragments from artillery and mortar shells or mines. The United States Army reportedly indicated that casualties during the Korean War declined by more than 30 percent after the introduction of a flak vest. The Israeli Army estimated the decline in its casualties during the war in Lebanon in 1982, based on effective torso protection, at about 25 percent. The Red Army of the Soviet Union also is reported to be issuing flak vests to particularly threatened soldiers, as has been reported reliably from Afghanistan.

The synthetic chemical fiber "Aramit" makes it possible to produce a vest with comparatively little weight--the basic model weighs about 3 kg--and optimum protection effect. According to information supplied by the Defense Ministry, this substance "is five times as strong as steel although the weight is the same." Over the next 5 years, the Bundeswehr will procure 16,000 flak vests; they will be made in the FRG. Defense Minister Woerner will hand the first flak vests to personnel of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy at the 27th Airborne Brigade in Lippstadt this coming Thursday.

A contract governing the future training of helicopter pilots of the German Navy in Great Britain was signed on Wednesday in the Defense Ministry by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir Staveley, and the Inspector General of the Navy, Vice Admiral Mann. According to the Defense Ministry, applicants for helicopter pilot careers in the German Navy will get their 15 months of training, together with British applicants, in Great Britain, starting in February. Admiral Sir Staveley also met with the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, Admiral Wellershoff, and State Secretary Ruehl, in the Defense Ministry.

5058

CSO: 3620/133

DESTROYER FLOTILLA'S OPERATIONAL TRAINING ASSURES READINESS

Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German Nov/Dec 86 pp 546-549

[Article by Rear Admiral Konrad Ehrensberger, Commander of Destroyer Flotilla: "Operational Training in the Destroyer Flotilla"]

[Text] Planning Of Training And Limiting Conditions

The destroyer flotilla is responsible for establishing and maintaining the operational readiness of its ships and boats. Operational readiness includes the three areas of materiel, personnel and training. The availability of materiel and complete staffing are prerequisites for training and will not, therefore, be discussed further.

Training is based on the destroyer flotilla's Operational Training Program which defines the content and extent of the training plan and determines the basic time frame of its execution.

An operational maintenance and scheduling standard has been set up for each class of ship which establishes the intervals and time periods for the overhaul of ships. The periods in between are the times at which operational training must be carried out. Consequently, the operational training program for each individual ship of the destroyer flotilla must be adjusted to its established standard operational maintenance cycle.

Aside from these two limiting conditions, plans for operational training are also affected by operational tasks assigned by the fleet command. Here it is important to execute assigned tasks with those ships which--on the basis of their training status--are best equipped to perform the task and which can use, or need, the experience for their continued training.

Based on these three limiting conditions, the destroyer flotilla develops its contribution to the "General Annual Operational Training and Maintenance Plan of the Fleet." This plan is issued by the fleet command and defines all operations for each ship for a period of 1 year.

The objective of operational training should be to develop destroyer and frigate formations which are operationally ready and able to fulfill their

mission as an integrated unit. To reach this goal, operational training is carried out in the following steps:

- individual ship training;
- integration of the ship into a unit;
- unit training.

This process requires participation in training programs of very different types. The vigorous integration of the German Navy into NATO inevitably requires completion of both national and NATO training phases. Integration into NATO units is particularly pronounced for destroyers and frigates and is the reason for the predominant use of NATO directives. The objective and content of national and NATO training phases as well as their structure will be discussed below.

Chart No 1: Training Phases and Programs of the Destroyer Flotilla:

<u>Training Phases</u>	<u>National Training Program</u>	<u>NATO Training Programs</u>
individual ship training	--individual training --ship security	basic operational sea training
integration into a unit	integration into combat formations	Standing Naval Force Atlantic
Training of units (combat formations)	--destroyer exercise --training in foreign waters --standard operational training unit of the fleet	--joint maritime course --NATO maneuver (such as Northern Wedding/Ocean Safari)

Individual Ship Training--National Individual Training

After the ship has been prepared for going to sea by theoretical in-port training, several days are made available for individual training for which the commander is responsible. The ship now has a chance to practice all operational functions and to gather nautical experience. At this time, it is particularly important for the commander to make use of internal ship exercises to fuse his crew into a coherent unit.

Ship security is singularly important during this phase. Consequently, the ship is assigned to the Ship Security Training Group in Neustadt to assure that, under expert guidance, internal operations are also stabilized from the viewpoint of security.

After completion of individual training, the crew should be able to handle the ship securely. Still lacking is familiarity with combat operations.

Basic Operational Sea Training (BOST)

After the preliminary national training, training is shifted to the Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) in Portland, Great Britain. During Basic Operational Sea Training (BOST), the ship as a whole is being trained under for its mission, including its combat missions, under British guidance. NATO training is experienced here for the first time, although this aspect, naturally, has a distinct British flavor. Exercises, extending to all possible operational commitments of the ship, should enable the crew to operate ship and weapons under all conditions.

Integrating The Ship Into The Unit--Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT)

Ships which have completed training up to and including BOST, must now become integrated into a unit. This is most apparent when incorporating into STANAVFORLANT. Three ships of the destroyer flotilla are incorporated annually into STANAVFORLANT, each for a period of about 4 months. This integration serves the purpose of continuing the ship's training as part of a unit but also serves to familiarize the crew with NATO procedures and NATO's manner of handling operational command. The knowledge of operational command procedures for NATO units gained here will remain with the individual officer and will, therefore, eventually also become incorporated into unit training on the national level. Only in this way can there be long-term assurance that German units, when assigned to larger NATO units, will be at the same level of training and will operate in accordance with the same principles and procedures. Thus, the assignment of individual ships to STANAVFORLANT, aside from providing training as part of a formation, has major and long-term significance for the integration into NATO naval forces.

Training of National Units

The integration of individual ships into a unit also takes place on the national level. The difference is frequently due to the fact that units are constituted at specific times, so that integration into a unit and training of the unit are not clearly separable but run parallel with one another. The availability of experienced units is indispensable for the German Navy to fulfill its operational mission.

In the case of destroyers and frigates a unit is generally assumed to consist of four ships. Such a unit can then be attached to larger configurations of NATO naval forces.

The destroyer flotilla has 16 destroyers and frigates at its disposal. Seen over an extended period of time, 25 percent of them are in the process of

being overhauled and 25 percent are in the individual ship training phase or with STANAVFORLANT. This leaves eight ships to form two combat formations of four ships each.

The destroyer flotilla currently consists of four squadrons of various classes and of different sizes. The 4th Frigate Squadron has six class-122 frigates; the 1st Destroyer Squadron has three class-103 destroyers; the 2d Destroyer Squadron has four class-101 destroyers and the 2d Escort Squadron has three class-120 frigates. This alone is an indication that combat formations can not be formed out of one squadron. Since the number of available ships within a squadron is further reduced by periods of overhaul, a combat group is not, generally speaking, comparable to a squadron. Moreover, the classes differ significantly in their armament, so that the total range of required operations cannot be performed by one class alone. This is not only due to the difference in armaments but also to the different ages of individual classes of ships. The goal, therefore, must be to create combat formations out of a mixture of all classes in order to do justice to the total range of weapons of destroyers and frigates.

Combat formations constituted in this manner need more time to engage in joint maneuvers. Only by regular exercises will a unit become familiar with itself and develop its full operational potential. To achieve a decisive success in training requires not only that the unit's ships remain together but also that the respective unit commander continuously leads and trains the unit.

A combat formation consisting of four ships of different classes under unified command should then, within 1 year, be exposed to the following national and NATO operations:

Destroyer Exercise (DESEX)

The unit receives its first training in a nationally planned and executed destroyer exercise (DESEX). The objective is that the commander of the combat formation effects the integration of his units. This training phase may be augmented by fire exercises at such foreign installations as the Centre d'Essaie des Landes (CEL) in Brest. However, national naval resources, especially the use of submarines and aircraft as exercise partners and as targets, should provide an adequate training environment which also permits further progress in the training of individual ships. Planning for DESEX requires considerable skill from the unit commander who must equalize different levels of training.

Training in Foreign Waters

Building on DESEX training, an extended tour to foreign countries under national command is designed to strengthen the unit's operational readiness. Longer sea journeys improve routine operations and create a uniformly high level of performance during continuous watch operations. To be on the move for 10 or more days is essential for carrying out orderly training procedures at sea.

Standard Operational Training Unit of the Fleet

DESEX and training in foreign waters are both characterized by the fact that planning and execution of training is primarily in the hands of the destroyer flotilla or of the unit commander. Other naval resources for training purposes are procured as needed. Conversely, for the purpose of national training at the fleet's standard operational training unit, the fleet command establishes integrated units. The combat formations of the destroyer flotilla are brought together with all the units of the Navy in the sense of an operational plan. Submarines, aircraft, fast patrol boats and minesweepers are assigned complex exercise problems in tactical sectors. The unit commander is now faced with the task of committing his combat formation in the context of higher objectives. At this level, the goal is to integrate a well-functioning combat formation successfully with higher levels.

Joint Maritime Course (JMC)

National training programs are supplemented by NATO exercises. Exercises are conducted at the Joint Maritime Course of the British Navy which are designed to enhance tactical operations within a unit or of a unit. Scenarios are, therefore, geared primarily to the tactical level of a unit and the strategic setting is of little significance. The training level of the unit is thereby raised in a similar manner to that of the standard operational training unit but this time in accordance with NATO standards.

NATO Maneuver

Such large-scale NATO maneuvers as NORTHERN WEDDING or OCEAN SAFARI are conducted within an expansive operational area. Larger units participate in these maneuvers which may extend over the entire North Atlantic. The configuration of these maneuvers, which include aircraft carriers, amphibious and antisubmarine task forces as well as nuclear strike submarines, requires careful integration of the different participating nations and their contingents. Combat formations which are attached to such large NATO formations must now prove themselves in a large-scale operation. This high demand, which is made in the course of such maneuvers, assumes that the combat formation has had experience as a sea-going unit and that it has received the best possible training. If such groups were constituted ad hoc, they could not do justice to such a task. It is also questionable whether individual ships could pass such a test if they were attached to NATO units. It is therefore important to prepare the combat formation specifically for this type of operation which may well correspond to actual wartime commitments.

The Combat Formations In The General Annual Operational Training and Maintenance Plan of the Fleet

The two combat formations of the destroyer flotilla constitute the nuclear of operationally-ready units which must be available at all times. Their composition remains the same for a period of 1 year. The training program of

a combat formation for the year is very demanding and time-intensive. In principle the combat formation is supposed to be at sea for 120 days. During this period the training programs of DESEX, operations in foreign waters, the JMC, NATO maneuvers and the standard operational training unit must be planned. The sequence of these operations may indeed vary since one is not necessarily a prerequisite for another. National planning does, of course, have to adjust to the overriding schedules of NATO maneuvers and the JMC. Consequently, operations of a combat formation do not follow the same pattern every year and a graphic presentation of such a training sequence can, therefore, serve only as an example. Operations are planned in blocks of time so that the longer intervening periods remain available for vacations for the crew. Planning must, therefore, attempt to avoid sporadic operations and give priority to training within a unit.

(1)	Kampfgruppe 1	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAI	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OKT	NOV	DEZ
	Mölders		D		A					N		S	
	Köln		E		A					A		E	
	Hamburg		S		G					T		F	
	Lübeck		E							O			
	.		X							E			
			(2)		(3)			(4)		(5)		(6)	

(1) Kampfgruppe 1 = Combat Formation 1

(2) DESEX = destroyer exercise

(3) AAG = training in foreign waters

(4) JMC = Joint Maritime Course

(5) NATOEX = NATO exercise

(6) SEF= standard operational training unit of the fleet

[Caption:] Illustrative example of a combat formation training schedule in the Annual General Operational Training and Maintenance Plan of the Fleet.

The small number of ships of the destroyer flotilla and numerous special assignments often make it difficult to follow these principles. Adherence to the principle of employing combat formation as a unit must clearly have priority. This approach tends to burden the other ships, which are in the individual ship training phase, with special tasks. But for these ships, too, planning must be unambiguous, well organized and predictable. This is even more important since three of these ships must complete the very demanding program at STANAVFORLANT.

The overriding goal of creating operationally-ready combat formations and of providing periods of time during which crews can plan their vacations, will make it even more necessary in the future to reduce secondary tasks to an absolute minimum. In future, ad hoc commitments will become even less feasible than heretofore. To draw the conclusion from this that the destroyer flotilla lacks operational flexibility does not, however, appear justified. Flexibility with few resources would mean accepting curtailments of other

objectives and may have the effect of seriously interfering with the personal plans of our soldiers.

The fact that a ship is part of a combat formation should not only give the crew reason to be proud but should also lead to an awareness that training and duty in this unit are executed effectively and with discipline, while still allowing for plannable leisure time.

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ARMORED ENGINEER VEHICLE ENHANCES ANTITANK CAPABILITIES

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Sep/Oct 86
pp 192-195

[Article by Hans-Ulrich Koelling: "Effect of the Introduction of the Engineer Tank 2 on Engineering Support in the Forward Combat Zone"]

/Text/ Preliminary Remarks

"In combat, the engineers primarily support the combat troops. Their requirements are determined not only by the intentions of the troop commander, how he wants to conduct the operation, but also by the type and scope of engineer deployment." (1)

"Their deployment is generally associated with the focal point of the operations." (2)

Consequently engineers and engineer tanks must generally work

- under time pressure,
- under enemy threat and
- in darkness.

"The scope of the individual tasks for engineer machines is often limited, but the number and frequency of their tasks is all the larger. Thus the main point is not the quality but the speed of executing the construction. This is especially true of engineer deployment in the forward areas, where cross-country combat vehicles must be supported and where deployment sites for short and intense utilization must be established." (3)

The engineer tanks (PiPz) are especially suitable for this. The PiPz that is available on the brigade level has several characteristics which exceed the capabilities of standard construction machines:

- armor protection
- a powerful drive
- capability of marching in convoys (even in open terrain) and
- capability of working by night.

Its working equipment, clearance shield, crane boom, cable winch, ground auger, and cutting and welding equipment make it capable of engineer deployments in the forward combat zone.

Since the PiPz, medium, is not available in sufficient numbers, and since its operating equipment is not optimized for the main tasks of the engineer vehicles, it is being replaced by the PiPz 2.

The PiPz 2 arises from rebuilding the PiPz, medium, and from armored recovery vehicles, standard. It has an improved clearance shield, a telescope-arm excavator with a backhoe, and adjustable electric cutting and welding equipment.

The operating units can also be used underwater (except for the cutting and welding equipment).

Particularly the excavator makes it possible to fulfill more engineering tasks than previously. The clear qualitative improvement has added to it a fourfold increase of the present stock.

Both the brigade engineers and the division engineers are equipped with the PiPz 2.

Engineering Tasks in the Covering Area

"Engineers must sustain the mobility of their own troops over the entire depth of the covering area. If bodies of water which represent severe obstacles must be overcome in the course of evasive actions, the promotion of mobility can also have priority over other tasks." (4)


Above all, a large number of waterways without stable banks means that 80 percent of the waterways in the Federal Republic cannot be crossed without engineering support.

The delay forces must have a sufficient number of crossing points so that they can evade in orderly fashion even an enemy in hot pursuit, and can face the enemy anew behind the waterway.

a) Support Possibilities With the PiPz, Medium

The deployment of amphibious river crossing equipment often is not possible precisely in narrow waters.

Engineer Tank, Medium
(PiPz, Medium)



At shore embankments, the PiPz, medium, can create entries and exits which lie barely above its rising and climbing capability. Two PiPz's, medium, are available for the covering area of a brigade. Because of their capabilities, they can create only a few passages at waterways. When there are few crossing points, one's own forces must be drawn prematurely from the delaying action, to avoid backups at the crossing points.

During the changeover from a broad distribution to a narrow one and back again, small forces of one's own must withstand the enemy pressure.

b) Support Possibilities With the PiPz 2

At waterways, the PiPz 2 can create entries and exits with a level difference of 4 m, so that its mobility in water can be fully utilized when needed.

At areas on the shore, which overstrain the cross-country capability of a combat tank, the PiPz 2 can draw itself up on land by means of its excavator, and from there can finish up the exit way.

The PiPz 2 can make trafficable banks that are three times as high as those made by the PiPz, medium. Since it need not push the material into the water with its shield, but can excavate it and deposit it on the side, the passage does not silt up so fast and can be used by more vehicles.

The two PiPz's of the brigade can be reinforced by four PiPz's of the DivPiBtl (Division Engineer Battalion).

The number and capabilities of the PiPz 2 make it possible, in the combat sector of a division, to prepare so many crossing points that the delay forces can retreat on a broad front at a uniformly slow rate while sustaining combat. Channelization and backups of one's own forces are avoided. At the same time, a maximum of fire against the enemy is maintained.

Since a time-limited defense becomes possible by increasing the fire power, additional time can be gained for preparing the defense.

Engineering Tasks in Defense

"The primary task of engineers in defense is interdiction. Other important tasks are

- support in the construction of field fortifications and
- the maintenance of the mobility of one's own forces." (5)

Engineers primarily set up mine blockades and demolition blockades. Engineer machines are used to set up structural blockades. Engineer machines are indispensable in the construction of field fortifications and for the maintenance of mobility.

Tank protection is especially important precisely for deployment in the combat zone of the combat troop.

a) Support Possibilities With the PiPz, Medium

The PiPz, medium, can establish antitank ditches with a rectangular shape. Here, one Pz takes over conveyance in the lengthwise direction, and one takes over conveyance in the transverse direction. Thus both PiPz's of the brigade are bound up in the task.

When setting up field fortifications, the PiPz, medium, can establish emplacements for Pz's (tanks), Pz tank grenadiers, and PzJg's (antitank equipment).

Concealment possibilities must be created for the guns of the artillery and for supplies, through the interaction of levelers and loaders.

The maintenance of mobility includes overcoming devastated and contaminated terrain.

The PiPz, medium, has the capability for this. Its performance capability is limited because it must work primarily with its clearing shield. For many tasks, support by a loader unit is necessary, which cannot be used under collective protection.

b) Support Possibilities With the PiPz 2

The PiPz 2, as sole vehicle, can set up antitank ditches in triangular form. Thus, without support from the DivPiBtl in the combat zone of a brigade, it is possible to work at two points simultaneously.

The introduction of the PiPz 2 increases the capacity of a corps to set up antitank ditches (PzAbw) by 30 percent. (6)

Because it is equipped with an excavator, the PiPz 2 needs no support from loading units, which can be used neither in darkness nor under ABC conditions.

Furthermore, firing sites for the artillery can be prepared with the PiPz 2.

The two PiPz 2's of a brigade can bring the PzArtBtl (tank artillery battalion) into the ground in 9 hours.

During the same time it is possible to bring into position one PzBtl (tank battalion) and one PzGrenBtl.

When preparing a defense, the PiPz's of the DivPiBtl at the focal point of the brigade, can establish emplacements for two ArtBtl's (Artillery Battalions) in 9 hours.

In the clearing of debris, the PiPz 2 can also largely dispense with outside support.

By alternately using the clearing shield, the excavator, and the cutting and welding equipment, it is able to create quick passages through debris-filled terrain.

Its equipment with a telescope excavator enables the PiPz 2 to perform still further tasks.

In water sectors at the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area), which is suitable for the crossing of enemy infantry, the shores can be reinforced, from the water and from the land, so that undetected landing by night is made considerably more difficult.

For this purpose, the trees of the low-land forests are placed by the excavator in such a fashion that they form obstacles against dismounted infantry. They can be reinforced by concealed explosives. Precisely in terrain sections which must be held by one's own dismounted grenadiers, protection can thus be significantly improved to a width of 100-200 m.

Furthermore, the PiPz 2 can create a fire sector at the FEBA. Especially for the deployment of antitank weapons, it is possible to create observation and action capabilities by pushing down trees or tearing down smaller buildings.

Engineer Tasks in Attack

"The most important task of engineers in attack is to support their own troops in the overcoming of obstacles." (7)

These obstacles primarily include

- narrow waters
- indentations, declivities
- ditches, funnels
- precipices, dams and
- embankments.

When a brigade attacks over waterways, one generally needs to establish two bridgeheads, each with three passage points.

If terrain obstacles cannot be circumvented, passages through them or over them must be created quickly, in order to avoid a backup of forces and in order to reduce the effect of enemy airforce and artillery fire.

a) Support Possibilities with the PiPz, Medium

Two PiPz's, medium, are available for the desired six passage points of a brigade.

Their action capability is limited to shore heights of about 1.5 m. The DivPiBtl has available only unarmored engineer machines, which are not suitable for reinforcement in attack.


The PiPz, medium, is also only conditionally suitable for overcoming precipices and fields with debris. Reinforcements and the formation of focal points are not possible.

b) Support Possibilities With the PiPz 2

By reinforcement from the DivPiBtl, a brigade can deploy up to six PiPz 2's in attack.

Thus one PiPz is available at each passage point. After the passage has been accomplished, it is redeployed forwards, to overcome further terrain obstacles.

Creation of a Passageway



Because of the range of the excavator arm, the PiPz 2 can open up many obstacles which cannot be overcome with the PiPz, medium, on account of its restricted capability and its small numbers.

Further Applications

In contrast to the PiPz, medium, and in contrast to the BPz (construction tanks), standard, the operating units of the PiPz 2 remain operational underwater. For this reason, it can be used for recovery and clearing underwater.

On land, too, it is well suited as a recovery vehicle.

The breaking teeth at the clearing shield enable it to break open concrete and frozen ground.

By means of the cable winch, it can pull the quick-construction highway over ground or over debris-covered sections that have minimal load capacity. Thus, even vehicles on wheels can quickly follow over terrain obstacles.

Summary/Conclusions

The PiPz 2 makes available to the engineer troop a unit by means of which its main tasks can be better managed than with its predecessor model. Its distribution among brigade and division engineers for the first time enables the division engineer commander to offer the formation of focal points in the forward battle zone.

The performance increase associated therewith opens up the possibility of influencing the planned operations command.

Intensive training must take place to be able to utilize these technical capabilities.

Only by frequent practice at and in the waterways, will the engineers become capable to furnish the required performances under combat and under time pressure.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) HDv 280/100 No. 319
- 2) HDv 700/108 No. 1312
- 3) Maj.Eng.(grad) Ralf Nebel Soldat und Technik (Soldiers and Engineering) 3/81
- 4) HDv 280/100 No. 928
- 5) HDv 280/100 No. 901
- 6) Compare Horst Basler Annual Report FueAkBw (Command Team for Defense) 31 October 1981
- 7) HDv 280/100 No. 915

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SCHOLAR BACKS ARMED FORCES' DOCTRINE ON NUCLEAR WAR

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Jan 87 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Stefan Forss: "The Armed Forces and Nuclear Weapons"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Dr Stefan Forss joins the debate about our defense policy and the nuclear weapons problem and points out that the criticism which has been directed at the armed forces, and particularly at their "negligence of the nuclear weapons threat" is highly misdirected.

Recently our country's security policy has been an object of increasing interest to the media. This is natural, given a background of a whole series of significant events. The super power leaders' meeting in Reykjavik, the president's address to the Paasikivi Society, the establishment of a shadow committee to the defense policy commission, and protests by the armed forces leadership over budget appropriations which were not granted, these are some examples (each of very different weight) of such events.

Of central importance when we analyze the role of the armed forces in security policy is an assessment of threat scenarios, viz. those various types of conflict to which our country could fall prey. But inasmuch as the future is uncertain, we are obliged to turn to probable assessments and sort out the threat scenarios which are of greatest significance to us. It is proper that military appropriations be proportioned in accordance with such an overall analysis.

For some time now the leadership of the Finnish armed forces has maintained the view that nuclear weapons can have no practical military use. (This certainly does not mean that our highest military men should dismiss nuclear war as categorically impossible, as Admiral Klenberg observed in a television discussion on 17 January.) Their only purpose is to prevent the outbreak of a war. However it is possible to envision situations which could arise in which conventional combat forces might be used in areas which are of concern to us as well. We must therefore have the capacity to respond adequately to such threats. If they lack sufficient resources, the armed forces certainly cannot be expected to manage to discharge the duties which parliament has given them.

It is generally thought in circles critical of the armed forces that it makes no major difference if the armed forces are allocated more or fewer resources since Finland is still arming itself for "blunder war." Our official scenario for the most likely war--of short duration, intense, destructive, but above all else, conventional--is not held in high regard in those critical circles. Instead there is in those circles a belief in a total war in which nuclear weapons as well would be used after war had gone on for a while.

It should nevertheless be emphasized that the armed forces' leadership's view of the role of nuclear weapons is not a newly arrived Finnish idea. During the entire decade of the 1980's, this same sort of thinking was advanced by many prominent influential Westerners. Robert McNamara and George Kennan are two respected names in this connection. As Kennedy and Johnson's defense minister, the former had a direct influence on the formation of nuclear weapons doctrines. He understood that the reliability of the American nuclear weapons umbrella rested to a large extent on the capability of the Western alliance's conventional defenses. For this reason he wanted to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to a level at which the USA itself and not just Western Europe was threatened. However, McNamara did not see his ideas implemented while he was in office. Instead, a number of efforts were later made to convince East bloc states that war would perforce escalate to the nuclear weapons stage almost immediately after the outbreak of war. A practical step in this direction was placing a number of tactical nuclear weapons in such prominent positions that they could knowingly and willingly be lost to the enemy at the initial stage of war. The English expression "use them or lose them" gives a good description of what this issue is about. Deterrence of this sort, however, is not particularly reliable. In the 1980's, the NATO countries at last began to abandon this strategy. As conventional forces were being modernized, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from use, and things are supposed to continue in this vein. In this way the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons could be both raised and made more reliable.

There can still be reasons for pointing out that the view of nuclear weapons held by the leadership of the Finnish armed forces is also shared by a number of senior NATO military experts. British Field Marshall Lord Carver is a good example. He wrote a book about military policy in 1982 ("A Policy For Peace") in which he argued strongly for his basic conviction, a massive reduction of NATO's dependency on nuclear weapons. As expected, he endured sharp criticism from his own ranks, but he brushed this aside, saying that in his long military career he had gotten used to not marching in step. The course of events in the past few years shows, however, that his criticism has remained no less striking.

In this debate, cruise missiles have been cited as an important example of the attempt to make the dividing line between a conventional and a nuclear weapons war vaguer. The argument starts with the observation that certain American cruise missiles, which on the outside all look the same, can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. In practice (at least for the time being), this means that every foreign cruise missile spotted in any super power confrontation should be assumed to be carrying a nuclear warhead. This is

viewed with distress in American military circles since conventional cruise missiles could probably be effective and fairly inexpensive weapons which could be used against individual important targets. So the Americans have suggested various technical methods to "affix a mark of identification" on those conventional cruise missiles. These efforts have not been met with sympathy on the Soviet side. We are exceedingly near to assuming that the Soviets quite coldly expect that, under the assumptions now prevailing, the Americans will not attempt to use any cruise missiles at all.

Modern cruise missiles provide a textbook case of what unrestrained arms development can lead to. In the USA this development is largely managed by military technical research and market forces. The result is that new, sophisticated weapons are constantly popping up which for a short while are technically better than the opponent's system but which in the long run does a disservice to its own security (and that of the whole world as well).

Tough political management and oversight are needed if we are to avoid unpredictable and often negative consequences in new weapons systems which are put into service. The American social system does not do things this way. For this reason, it is also a mistake to draw the conclusion that the cruise missiles' double role should be an extensively planned, deliberated measure of military policy so a war's different aspects can be erased. (Furthermore the airplane has also a similarly controversial double role!)

The criticism which has been directed at the armed forces from various quarters, and especially that criticism of its "negligence of the nuclear weapons threat," is highly misdirected. Indeed it can be said that the military's view of its mission shows that in this respect they have borne the essentials of the international debate on military policy in mind. Sound reason and an understanding of technically-related realities can be discerned as well.

Of course, the power of the armed forces does not deserve just praise. As an institution they are slow and reforms occur slowly. Part of its central operational forms are very musty and are almost an embarrassment for a modern democratic society. In this respect a comparison with Sweden is clearly important. These are reasons to return to this subject in a later article.

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CSO: 3650/63

AIR FORCE'S NEW CHIEF: PLANES TO NEED REPLACING IN 1990'S

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Feb 87 p 7

[Article: "Jokinen: 'Materiel Will Need To Be Replaced'"]

[Text] (FINNISH NEWS BUREAU) As the new chief of the air force, General Major Pertti Jokinen, 51, assumes his duties, Finland has more fighter planes than ever since the war. The number of airplanes today is much closer to the maximum of 60 permitted under the Paris peace agreement.

"Although the materiel is good and satisfies current needs splendidly, it will have to be replaced in the second half of the 1990's. This applies to the Draken as well as the Mig planes," Jokinen stated. That means that the air force will have to replace three fighter plane divisions in the next decade.

Furthermore, at about the same time as new fighter planes are acquired, our remote surveillance radar will have to be replaced.

More Hawk Planes Needed

"At the time the Hawk training planes were bought, it was thought that 50 was an absolute minimum number," Jokinen said. "We have already lost two of them. If the number of Hawk planes goes down much more, then we will land in a situation in which it will become hard to look after the training of fighter pilots," he said.

Jokinen stated that it is statistically predictable that the number will decline in the next ten years, inasmuch as the accident rate sits at about 0.7 percent per 10,000 flying hours.

"If the number of jet training planes dips below 40, the air forces will find themselves in an extremely difficult situation. We must try to hold the number of training planes to a minimum of at least 50, since every flying hour which can be transferred from a fighter plane to a Hawk significantly reduces total costs," the new chief said.

Personnel Shortage

"The air force's biggest problem today is still the personnel shortage," Jokinen said. The greatest shortage is on the technical side and, generally

speaking, it appears there are too few positions.

"Nevertheless the air force cannot let expenditures for personnel increase as much as they want. First we have to see if further reorganization can take place. Yet I have the feeling that there are no great prospects of this," Jokinen said.

The air force's airfield network is very good, in Jokinen's view, and he said that more military bases are not needed.

Jokinen stated that the main element in the present development of the armed forces is ground forces.

"It is a question of a good deal of money, and then of this development in different sectors taking place in an orderly and timely fashion. Ground forces are now being developed, and at the right time it will be the air forces' turn," the new chief observed.

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COAST GUARD TAKES DELIVERY OF NEW PATROL CRAFT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Jan 87 p 4

[Article: "'Kiisla' Good For 30 Knots"]

[Text] Rauma (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET)--On Thursday, at the Hollming Shipyard in Rauma, the christening of the Kiisla [Guillemot], a heavy patrol boat designed for patrol and rescue missions in the Baltic Sea and designed as well for use during crises, took place. The boat is a prototype and it is expected that units of this type will replace outmoded Koskelo-type patrol boats.

The Kiisla has a maximum length of 48 meters and width of 9 meters, its largest draft being 2.3 meters. The boat is constructed entirely of aluminum and equipped with two light 16-cylinder turbo-charged diesels. With a total of 96 valves, the equipment yields a total effective power of 9,000 hp.

Its top speed is still being kept secret but is described as being "adequate." Given the fact that the boat is constructed of light material, it should be able to move at a speed of around 30 knots. Instead of propellers, the boat is equipped with two sets of hydraulic jet machinery manufactured by KaMeWa which are the largest in Scandinavia; its inlet pipes, for instance, have a diameter of 90 cm.

The functioning of both the machinery and the other equipment is completely automatic. There is a great deal of recreational space for the crew on board, at least in peacetime.

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CSO: 3650/63

INTERMARINE SELLS MINESWEEPERS TO U.S. NAVY

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Dec 86 p 7

[Article by Vincenzo Nigro: "Italian Minesweepers for the U.S. Navy"]

[Text] Rome—With quotas or without quotas, the arms trade knows no respite. And yesterday Italy announced a mini-major coup: Intermarine, a shipyard that produces glass-resin boats, will build minesweepers for the U.S. Navy. The Italian company, part of the Montedison group, will establish an Intermarine USA to produce the prototype to be submitted for the Navy's tests; then the other minesweepers will be built for the Americans.

The minesweeper is the modern version—in electronics and computerization—of the old minesweeper, the ships that mechanically "cleaned" the ocean floor of mines and various devices sown by the enemy. How was it possible that the Italians won this contest? It is simple. Because they had an idea that no one else had, and above all because they carried it out. In fact, the Intermarine case reflects a "brain flight" in reverse, that of Michael Trimming, the designer of the British Vosper, who some years ago moved to the Italian shipyard. In Liguria, Trimming found the resources and support to produce a type of minesweeper whose hull is produced by a single "casting" of glass-resin. This is the "Lerica," already adopted by the Italian Navy, and with three more on line, Sapri, Milano and Vieste. "The result is very good, because a hull constructed in a single unit has the advantage of better resistance to possible explosions of the mines over which the minesweeper has to move to perform its task," explained Giovanni Lazzari, director of RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA and an expert in the field.

The victory of the Italian shipyard is a double success, since it had to cope with a firm American protectionism. Intermarine had competed in the first contest for the new minesweepers with support of the U.S. Marinet against Karlskrona shipyard in Sweden, which in turn had support of Textron, a company linked to Bell (the helicopter company). It was an unequal struggle, because the Swedish-American was successful in a quite effective "lobbying" operation in its contacts with the U.S. Navy and the Congress. However, after the resistance tests, the Americans backtracked: "The Europeans are the only ones capable of constructing really competitive minesweepers, and the Italians are the best among them," candidly admitted Ever Pyatt, assistant to the powerful Navy Secretary John Lehman. In short, the U.S. defense secretary preferred to backtrack and abandon a losing project. In conclusion, a few facts about the "Lerici": the boat is about 50 meters long and 10 meters wide, it has a traditional diesel engine and three small hydraulic engines for lateral movement (two in the stern and one in the bow).

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CSO: 3528/59

NEW LAW BEING FORMED TO GOVERN ARMS SALES

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Dec 86 p 7

[Article by Mino Fucilla: "Is the Bill Tough Enough?"]

[Text] "Italy will continue to export weapons and materiel because the arms trade is good for our own defense and for the economy," but "will refrain from fanning the sparks of tension." Also likely is a freeze on military aid to third-world countries deemed to be over-spending on weapons. A select committee of cabinet ministers will determine whether and to whom such sales may be made.

"It's like stripping the gloriously gaudy silks from the riders in the Siena Palio horserace and putting them into long-johns," said one government official, only after the inquirer swore never to reveal the official's name: the "long-johns" come with the impending passage of the bill, and the "Palio" is the arms market. Hence the bill, a potent alibi combined with ritual purification or, if you will, an effort to forge iron-clad rules to control and contain an enterprise whose one and only rule is to scuttle the competition, by fair means or foul. In a world where lawmakers are urged to scrutinize the watermarks on the paper used for publishing their remarks, so as to make sure they conceal no suggestions or documents from Italian or foreign companies or departments, they are striving to cross every T and dot every I in the compendium of propriety. The result is, inevitably, a bill that leaves the arms-makers supremely indifferent: what it says, in essence, is that "from now on, everything will continue as it has hitherto," but it is also one that suits the governing parties, mollifies those in the opposition, and offers balm for tender consciences.

Even so, any law is better than none at all, and the bill submitted to Parliament on 24 May 1985 carries a roster of extremely impressive signatures: Spadolini, Andreotti, Acalfaro, Martinazzoli, Romita, Visconti, Gorla, Altissimo, Capria, Gaspari... in short, you might call it a roll-call of Craxi's first cabinet: an introduction to clarify the ideological horizon, followed by 20 articles laying down the ground-rules. Here is the bill's philosophy: Italy will go on selling arms because arms sales

are good for its economy and for its own defense, but will refrain from fanning the sparks of tension, while yielding not an iota to "dubious theories of unilateral disarmament, dismantling, or destructive constraints upon our industries."

Levels of Secrecy

In order to achieve that laudable goal, the bill provides that, in future, decisions as to whether or not to sell will be made by a committee of ministers advising the Cabinet, rather than a nameless committee of faceless government functionaries. This will mean that individual decisions will be subject to political responsibility for the individual concerned.

It also provides that, to sell arms abroad, the vendor must be registered in a kind of professional directory, so as to screen out dealers with felony records or those who conceal their identities behind interchangeable acronyms of convenience. Clearly, all of this is fully justified: what is odd is that we have gone along for so long the way we did.

Nor is that all: since everything these days is secret, it has been decided that the entire Cabinet must report annually to Parliament. But wait: not to Parliament in open session, but to yet another committee, consisting of the Prime Minister's staff; this body will be empowered to "deal by its own decree with the levels of secrecy to be attached to its various operations and documentation, and to the minutes of its meetings." The secret classification will remain, but at least the law will indicate available procedures for lifting it in cases of extreme emergency.

Then come the penalties: one to five years imprisonment plus a fine of one-half the value of the operation in cases of grave irregularities, and on up from there. "Triangulation," as it is called—pretending to sell weapons to a peaceable country which agrees to divert them to a nation at war—is perceived as a very serious infraction of the law. No reprisals are contemplated against a country that lends itself to this kind of dealing. It is a problem that calls for diplomatic initiative, not for criminal sanctions. Be that as it may, thus far there has been no publicly audible expression of displeasure or pressure from the Farnesina.

This is the bill the government has introduced: it had slumbered for a time in the halls of Parliament, only to be roused again, not so much by the heated arguments over Talmone as by action taken by a portion of the Catholic community to bring pressure on the DC and its members of Parliament in general. Local ACLI (Christian Workers) calls, their magazines, and their missionary associations put the pressure on and the bill has been retrieved

from its dusty pigeonhole and presented to the select committee for initial scrutiny.

It emerged somewhat transformed: it now provides that exports of weapons are forbidden to all countries affected by the U.N. embargo, that such exports are forbidden when they are deemed "incompatible with our international commitments, with our security, with the struggle against terrorism, and in cases in which the country of destination cannot provide guarantees as to the handling and ultimate destination of such materials. You could hardly ask more of a law than that; of course, the market for Italian weapons exports would shrink considerably if these constraints were to be rigorously respected.

The Catholics, though, have won another ban: economic aid is to be withheld from any third-world country found to spend a higher percentage of its national budget on such purchases than Italy does. In other words, no more lire to countries that buy too many rifles and cannons. The reckoning necessitated may turn out to be a headache, but so is the logic: Is a computer more lethal if it is mounted on a bomber than a shipment of 1,000 machineguns? Note that the computer is more economical and may be sold as equipment not necessarily destined for lethal use.

Another shortcoming in the law before revision has been corrected: anyone connected with agencies responsible for control of arms trading will now be subject to a kind of embargo for a period of 2 years, during which he may not serve as CEO in any arms-manufacturing enterprise. These days, such "networking" is commonplace. It's not a question of fat wads of bills, but one of industrial policy, since many have voiced suspicions that the entire weapons industry is, one way or another, a sector of the national economy that is drawing "welfare" from the public at large.

One last problem: secrecy and openness. The current idea is the following: Cabinet members will report to Palazzo Chigi, and Palazzo Chigi will report to Parliament once a year.

This is the cage, maybe the best one we could get, given the fact that it is expected to contain the opposite of everything. Under the law, citizens have the moral and economic right to, just as the Catholics a right to refuse to supply the weapons Christians use to kill each other. The law will regulate any lucrative trade and at the same time the notion that arms exports are frequently a projection of a country's foreign policy.

It emerged from the process metamorphosed to a degree: it says now that arms exports to countries affected by U.N.-approved embargoes are forbidden when they are found to be "incompatible with our international commitments, with our security, with the fight against terrorism, or when they are tools of the consignee country, guarantees as to management and end-use of the materials. One could hardly ask more than that of one single law. Of course, the market for Italian-made weapons exports would shrink considerably should these restraints be stringently enforced.

The Catholics, though, have come up with another roadblock: They are calling for yet another roadblock in the form of a freeze on economic aid to Third World countries that spend a greater percentage of their overall budget on weapons acquisitions than Italy does. In other words, no more lire to any countries that buy too many rifles and cannon. Keeping track of all that spending might prove a tall order, but at least as difficult is plodding through the torturous logic invoked: which is more "lethal:" a computer installed on a fighter-bomber, or a shipment of 1,000 machineguns? Be it noted that a computer is cheaper, and that it can be sold as equipment not necessarily purchased for military purposes.

Another shortcoming in the bill on second reading has been corrected: anyone working for agencies or bodies concerned with monitoring weapons sales must, upon termination of such activity, abide by what might be called a 2-year embargo, barring him from assuming directorship of an arms manufacturing company. The fact is that, these days, "interconnections" are proliferating. It's not a question of "package deals," but a matter of industrial policy, which leads many to the conclusion that the whole of the arms industry is, one way or another, being spoon-fed by an indulgent government.

One last problem: secrecy and "openness." The current option calls for the following procedure: the cabinet ministers are to report to Palazzo Chigi, and Palazzo Chigi, in turn, is to report to Parliament.

This is the cage, and it may be the best possible one, given the fact that it must be capable of containing the good, the bad, and the indifferent alike. Under the bill, one must be an Italian national to accede to the moral and economic right to sell arms, akin to the way the Christian Democrats refuse to purvey arms Christians need to kill one another. The bill will include regulations covering lucrative enterprises and, at the same time, the idea that arms exports are often a country's extension of its foreign policy. Among the conflicting concepts that will have to coexist are those of sanctions against violators, along with the "extra-legality" in which the secret services are accustomed to operate. They must abide by government decisions and comply with "spoken orders" which explains why for several months now, no more weapons have been sold to one European country found to possess two military rifles per citizen.

And they will have to live with the concept of sanctions against those who stray from the strait and narrow, along with the "a-legality" in which the secret services must operate. They must side by side with the official acts, the authorizations under the heading of "spoken orders" under which, for several months, weapons were withheld from a European country found to contain more than two military rifles per capita.

The law, though, born of an unlikely understanding among the Radicals' charges, the Republicans, and Communists' determination to make order, and Catholics' ideological rejection of war, once it becomes law, will have at least won one great advantage: it will let us see precisely who is to be blamed for making the wrong decision, and who should get credit for making the right one. Governments in office will never again be able to say that they didn't know.

Fringe Operators Will be Always With Us

Everything else will stay the way it always has been: That statement was sworn to by a "regional chief" of a Milanese company that for years has kept in touch with the international "agents" in the arms market.

"Every company has at least five or six addresses, according to the various areas of the world. Often they seem to be operating from a quasi-monopolistic position. Often they ask us sell an item that costs 1,000 lire for 1,3000. They have to do their own financing, the governments and the parties of the countries in which they make sales. And nobody will ever change that. The same goes for a crew or a shipowner eager to turn his ship into a "triangle," thereby quadrupling the price for charter."

There will always be the fringe operators and the semi-clandestine markets, along with the national industries "assisted" by States all over the world. Italy in 1984 was second to none in this field. As of 5 November 1984, a decree signed by the Industry minister, the State participations minister, and the defense minister establishes a special committee whose mission is "to coordinate research for military purposes," "to guide and coordinate production between industry and defense," "to encourage foreign marketing of production in excess of what is needed at home," to formulate proposals for guiding and coordinating the activities of our military experts abroad." As of that date, we have a communications network linking the arms production companies and State agencies which administer and govern some 10 trillion lire worth of billing in 1986 and 46 trillion lire worth of arms exports (the figures came from Adm Mario Porta, National Director of Armaments).

We shall still have to cope with restraints and authorizations far more powerful than those laid down in an Act of Parliament. They make it clear, for instance, that in every weapons system Italy imports there is one component, usually an electronic one, that was manufactured here under an American license. Hence, if the U.S. is opposed, Italy will find it very difficult indeed to export the component, and that, of course, is not confined to Italy.

We shall still have to cope with individual cases of "mixed sovereignty": only in recent months have we learned, among other things, that when materiel is transferred from one NATO base to another on Italian territory, it is recorded on a declaration form which our customs service simply files. The AE-302 form, as it is known, is then checked out by an American official. That is all it takes, because nobody ever bothers to look and see just what is in those shipping crates.

Still in effect will be the ties between interests of State, of faction, and of industry, the connections between foreign policy and security services, the temptation to "buy" a foreign State in need of weapons, and the temptation to finance one's own power via the easy ruse of accumulating secret funds.

And lastly, we shall still have cope with the utterly inscrutable logic governing embargos: the embargo against Syria is officially in effect, but there is no current business with Syria, while for Iran and Iraq there is still business being done, but it is conducted under "political constraints," rather than an embargo.

Things like these, though, are not matters that only the law can regulate: all of this is matter for a commission of inquiry into what goes on inside the arms market. We know that something has already happened: the Defense Minister in office said "yes" one day and again the next that secret services similar to P2 used this trade to finance their political operations in Italy and abroad. And the present Foreign Trade Minister, Socialist Formica, stated, and has not since retracted his statement that Italy has not always been "sovereign" in this kind of decision-making.

The Triangulation of the United States

It has happened once, and it could happen again. In Washington, Reagan's presidency might actually come to grief in the wake of an example straight out of the handbook for "State triangulation": secret services that sell American weapons to Iran and siphon off the profits to the Contras in Nicaragua. In the corridors and in the admissions of our Parliament and our members of Parliament you encounter the universal certainty that something very much like that has already occurred in Italy, albeit on a far smaller scale.

Throwing up their hands, men of the majority and of the whole spectrum of opposition parties join in the view that no preventive action would ever work, but, they add, over there in America, if the lid ever does blow off, everybody would stand to lose, including Reagan himself. Here in Italy, though, everything would be kept within the discreet confines of the twilight zone, between the spoken and the unspoken—perhaps to surface, dimly, from time to time, and then hastily interred again. Maybe that is true: maybe not. If they ever do form a commission of inquiry, it will sit for 3 months: that would be a fairly painless wait, if it meant pulling us free of this miasma of doubt.

6182

CS0: 3528/59

REPORTED AMBITIONS OF NEW MILITARY CHIEF

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 3 Jan 86 p 11

[Excerpts] The Army High Command put forward the names of three general officers and the government selected one: not surprisingly, Gen Mario Firmino Miguel will be the Army Chief of Staff, an appointment that depends solely on President Soares's signature. It was not surprising because Firmino Miguel was, "by far the natural candidate and clearly stood out above the other two who were proposed," a source close to the government tells us. And he stood out so much that wits in military circles were commenting this week that the three names put forward by the Army High Command were "Mario, Firmino, and Miguel!..." Mario Firmino Miguel, who 3 years ago was the Army Vice-Chief of Staff, replaces Gen Salazar Braga, whose term of duty ended this past December 16, having completed the 3-year term of command to which he had been appointed.

The Climb

But who is this Firmino Miguel, about whom Brigadier (in the reserves) Pezarat Correia said not long ago that "perhaps no military man has gotten so much out of a revolution into which he put so little"? His name only gained public recognition when, just after the 25th of April and Spínola's suggestion, Palma Carlos called him to be minister of defense. The stigma of being a "Spínolista" comes to him from Guinea, where he distinguished himself as officer of operations. He was praised in 1973 for his "exceptional leadership qualities," 10 years after being decorated by Salazar with the highest rank of military medals, having made a name for himself in command of operations in Angola.

The 25th of April found him in Paris, where he was attending the upper-level War School. Previously, he was attributed with discreetly supporting the candidacy of Humberto Delgado, and it is known that, along with Eanes, he was one of the main opponents to the Congress of Combatants in 1973. And he would be, again along with Eanes, one of the winners of the 25th of November, whose operations he had helped prepare.

Firmino Miguel returned to the first and second constitutional governments of Mario Soares, and later with Nobre da Costa. He then became a teacher at the Military Academy, where he had been "one of the best students." In 1980,

he was sent to be the commander of the southern military region, and there are those who associated this "exile" in Evora with a reprisal from the then-Army Chief of Staff, Garcia dos Santos, because Firmino lent his discreet support to the presidential candidacy of Soares Carneiro.

The Goal

Mentioned innumerable times as probably, or almost certainly, prime minister during several political crises in the last decade, as also happened regarding two presidential candidacies that never quite got off the ground, Firmino Miguel always came up short, either because he was weighing his support and the consequences, or because he refused advancement in the name of "a military career to be seen through to the end."

And see it through he did--from vice-Army Chief of Staff to head of the army, a position for which he had already been mentioned three years ago, but he was passed over in favor of Salazar Braga, because of seniority. And from head of the army, Firmino Miguel will certainly be, within 3 years, the "best placed candidate" to rise to the top of the military hierarchy...

But as soon as he reaches the top of his military career, as his ambition indicates, the general will then be in a position to stop being the eternally deferred candidate. And, when he signs the appointment of the new Army Chief of Staff, Mario Soares (and Cavaco Silva?) will be granting a potential free entry ticket for Firmino Miguel to become his most powerful rival in the 1991 elections, within 5 years.

9895/9738

CS0: 3542/41

EXTENT OF SPANISH PARTICIPATION IN NATO DEBATED

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Jan 87 p 14

[Article by Andres Ortega: "Spain Willing to Send Units Outside Her Territory to Reinforce NATO Operations"]

[Text] Madrid--Spain no longer discards the notion of sending some military units to reinforce NATO operations outside the limits of Spanish territory, provided she does not subscribe to military integration, even though these troops might be put under the operational control of the Allied Commands, according to various Spanish diplomatic sources. Official Spanish statements to date have run contrary to this view. The second round of formal negotiations--or talks, as the Spanish side prefers to call them--on Spanish participation in the Atlantic Alliance will be held in Madrid on 26-27 January.

This round will see the start of talks on the missions or responsibilities the Spanish forces will be asked to undertake within the Atlantic blueprint, beginning with Spain's air and naval contribution, the role of the ground forces being considered "secondary" by both sides for the moment.

Some Allied countries, according to Atlantic sources--which, however, did not identify these countries by name--would like Spain to send troops outside her territory, as has Portugal, which has assigned a brigade to operations in the north of Italy. Spain, for her part, does not exclude this eventuality, either now or later.

In any case, the situation could change with the passage of time. This matter has been brought up on more than one occasion in the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU [West European Union]. At that body's most recent session, it was said, according to Atlantic Alliance sources, that subsequent to the reform of the WEU, which is scheduled to take shape this spring, and with the extent of the Spanish military contribution to NATO in view, Spain would be invited, in 1987, to join the Organization as of the beginning of the following year.

During the negotiating round in January, Spain will set forth the areas of responsibility it wants to assume for NATO or in cooperation with it. These

areas will center principally on the defense of the Baleares-Strait-Canaries axis and on the Peninsula's northwest naval sector. NATO for its part will express its views as to what it expects or would require from Spain.

The idea of placing Spanish forces under the operational control of the NATO Commands, but without integrating them into NATO, is the predominant one. Through coordination accords, Spain and NATO would agree on certain responsibilities to be assumed by some of the Spanish units.

Under Control

Such units would not be under the Atlantic Command but rather under the latter's control, as is in fact the case with some French forces--not integrated into NATO--in the air, naval and ground sectors, or as occurred, to cite a historic example, with the Blue Division, which was not under the German command but rather under German operational control.

The memorandum on the general form of Spanish participation does not in any way preclude these possibilities, although it says nothing specific as to missions for Spain if she is not militarily integrated. Actually, the operational control form is the predominant one in NATO as regards its naval sector. Hence, of NATO's three principal Commands (the Atlantic, the European, and the English Channel), it is the first of these that appears to be the most satisfied with the formula suggested by Spain, according to Atlantic sources.

Once these responsibilities have been defined, the coordination agreements between the NATO Commands (principal and subordinate) and the Spanish Military Commands will be negotiated. Probably--Spanish sources indicate--the missions that will continue to be performed by the U. S. troops remaining in Spain will be incorporated into the agreements between Spain and NATO, "since that is most logical," in addition to being covered by bilateral agreements between Spain and the United States. This would fill the vacuum that now exists in the coordination and planning between the U. S. forces in Spain and the Spanish forces.

The Questionnaire

Spanish diplomats feel that the questions of the integration of communications, of the air warning network, of participation in NATO maneuvers, and of offering terrain for maneuvers in Spain to the NATO countries, will present no problems whatever, absent any integration with the Atlantic Commands. Once again, the French pattern is to be followed.

Once the Spanish responsibilities have been defined, Spain will be able to execute the questionnaire on defense planning that is filled out every 2 years by the countries militarily integrated into NATO. Unlike these countries, Spanish sources say, Spain would only fill out the part of this questionnaire affecting the forces involved in the areas of responsibilities

coordinated with NATO. In meetings of the Defense Review Committee and of the Defense Plans Committee, Spain will be able to agree to forces plans and objectives within the Atlantic blueprint, as Defense Minister Narcis Serra himself has acknowledged, but without falling into integration, by way of what has come to be called an "analogical system" which NATO is pursuing. Unlike the integrated countries, Spain has no intention of agreeing that the NATO Commands can dictate what they consider to be the necessary forces objectives for Spain.

This issue of the incorporation of Spain into NATO planning was the subject of the first round of talks on 30-31 October and will be addressed again in January, possibly with conclusions as to the form of the system, even if not its content, since the latter depends on the missions. The case is more advanced than one would suppose. The representatives of the NATO services consider the Spanish position, as to continuing to participate in the Military Committee, to be a sound one. The main difference between the Spanish model and the French one lies in that Spain will participate in this committee and in the NATO planning system, as well as in the Nuclear Plans Group.

The fact that there are formal negotiating sessions does not mean that no negotiating is done between one such session and the next. Contacts between the Spanish side and the NATO negotiating delegation are ongoing. To date, everything is going well despite the trap some Spanish military personnel tried to lay, based on a collection of odd bits of information as to discontent with the Spanish formula among the NATO Commands--information that later proved to be unconfirmed at the formal meeting.

But the question has not yet been submitted formally for consideration by the member countries, they being the ones who decide. To date, the negotiation has been carried on with the NATO International Secretariat, the Military Committee and its support services, and with representatives of the Atlantic Alliance's principal Commands.

[Boxed insert]: Commands on the Rock

[By A. O.]

Madrid--The issue that poses the greatest problem ("the thorniest problem," say Spanish sources) is, without doubt that of the NATO Commands in Gibraltar (not to be confused with the British base on the Rock). Nevertheless, a solution that is beginning to emerge is to empty these Commands of content, which after all, militarily speaking, are not of extreme importance as Commands, but are indeed so as communications centers. Gibraltar houses two subordinate NATO Commands (its maritime GIBMED and its aerial GIBAIR), which Spain does not recognize.

Emptying the Rock Commands of their content would not mean eliminating them but simply sidestepping them. The functions now being provided by Gibraltar

could be provided by Spain, outside the Rock, under its eventual responsibilities in the Baleares-Strait-Canaries axis, leaving the Rock Commands dormant.

Taking advantage of the Spanish position, Portugal has requested that the Azores be incorporated directly into the IBERLANT Command (with headquarters in Lisbon) instead of being linked directly to NATO's principal Command in the Atlantic, whose general headquarters is in Norfolk, Virginia (United States). One problem, however, is that IBERLANT covers part of the area comprising a Spanish interest.

9238

CSO: 3548/34

POLL: LARGE POST-CHERNOBYL DROP IN NUCLEAR POWER SUPPORT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jan 87 p 25

[Article: "35 Percent Want to Abandon Nuclear Power"]

[Text] The Chernobyl nuclear powerplant accident has not only temporarily swayed public opinion; the aversion to nuclear power is even more widespread than before. This is what a followup study that has been in progress at Tampere University since 1983 reports.

Exactly less than half the number of people polled a year ago now support the further use of nuclear power. The percentage of the total their opinions represent has dropped from 28 to 14 percent. At the same time the percentage of those who are demanding the abandonment of nuclear power has more than doubled: from 14 to 35 percent.

The materials for the poll were collected about a half a year after the accident. This being the case, the immediate uproar and the period of overreaction was over and we can now judge from the report of the results how permanent the changes in attitude are. Prof Paavo Hoikka and researcher Pentti Kiljunen of the Tampere University Municipal Sciences Institute, who conducted the poll, say.

People's attitudes toward coal have also very clearly changed. The percentage of those who want to increase its use has risen from a fifth (20 percent) to a third (34 percent). People believe slightly more widely than before in the possibilities of exploiting the so-called alternative sources of energy like solar and wind power. Nearly one out of every two views them as being realistic [alternatives] and well over a fourth of the respondents in the opinion poll feel that they are daydreams.

More effective conservation is strongly supported (62 percent) as an alternative to the construction of new power plants. And this despite the fact that over half of them do not believe that the energy problems can be solved by economizing.

Citizens are dissatisfied with how decisions on energy policy are made and consider the process to be undemocratic and remote. Three-fourths of them feel

that their opinions are not sufficiently listened to in energy policy decisions.

The employment of a referendum on nuclear power is now more generally being demanded than before. Sixty-two percent of the population is of this opinion.

The Conservatives favor nuclear power. A third of them would increase our nuclear power capacity. DEVA [Democratic Alternative] supporters are also more favorable than the average to the construction of more nuclear power plants.

Those most clearly opposed to it are the Greens, among whose supporters an increase in nuclear power capacity is actually not supported at all.

The materials for the poll were collected between mid-September and mid-November and 3,700 people were interviewed. An overall response figure of fully 73.8 percent was obtained. The poll-takers think that the exceptionally large active participation in the poll is a consequence of the fact that energy issues aroused strong interest in citizens in the year that has just ended.

11,466

CSO: 3617/46

STUDY INDICATES COAL COMPETITIVE WITH NUCLEAR POWER IN COST

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Jan 87 p 24

[Text] Loviisa (HS)--The competitiveness of nuclear power in comparison with that of the other ways of producing electricity has declined. If we were to decide to build a nuclear power plant in Finland now, the electricity generated in it would not be very much cheaper than the power that can be obtained from coal-burning plants.

These calculations as to the advisability of nuclear power were made at Imatran Voima (IVO [Imatra Power Company]). As recently as last spring it was estimated that electricity could be produced with nuclear power for from 4 to 5 pennis a kilowatt hour less than with coal. Energy taxes have changed the price ratio so that the competitive advantage of nuclear power is now no more than from 2 to 4 pennis a kilowatt hour.

It has been calculated that it would cost from 16 to 17 pennis a kilowatt hour to produce electricity in a new nuclear power plant. Production costs are considerably less than in the currently operating power plants because they were built at clearly more favorable prices during the past decade than that of new construction in view of the change in currency value.

According to the IVO study, when we take into account the tax relief and subsidies received by peat-burning plants, there is not much difference in production costs between power obtained from peat and from coal. Nevertheless, electricity produced with peat is slightly more costly than power produced with coal.

Oil, on the other hand, cannot compete with coal and peat in the production of electricity. The price of crude oil would have to be \$7.50 a barrel before oil could compete with uranium as a fuel.

Despite the small difference in cost, IVO still feels that construction of a fifth nuclear power plant is warranted.

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